Competition and Coalition Formation of Renewable Power Producers
Stanford University（斯坦福大学）
Baosen Zhang, Ramesh Johari, Ram Rajagopal
备注：
To appear in IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, Special Section on Wind & Solar Energy: Uncovering and Accommodating their Impacts on Electricity Markets
We investigate group formations and strategic behaviors of renewable power producers in electricity markets. These producers currently bid into the day-ahead market in a conservative fashion because of the real-time risk associated with not meeting their bid amount. It has been suggested in the literature that producers would bid less conservatively if they can form large groups to take advantages of spatial diversity to reduce the uncertainty in their aggregate output. We show that large groups of renewable producers would act strategically to lower the aggregate output because of market power. To maximize renewable power production, we characterize the trade-off between market power and generation uncertainty as a function of the size of the groups. We show there is a sweet spot in the sense that there exists groups that are large enough to achieve the uncertainty reduction of the grand coalition, but are small enough such that they have no significant market power.We consider both independent and correlated forecast errors under a fixed real-time penalty. We also consider a real-time market where both selling and buying of energy are allowed. We validate our claims using PJM and NREL data.
Renewable energy generation is offered through electricity markets, quite some time in advance. This then leads to a problem of decision-making under uncertainty, which may be seen as a newsvendor problem. Contrarily to the conventional case for which underage and overage penalties are known, such penalties in the case of electricity markets are unknown, and difficult to estimate. In addition, one is actually only penalized for either overage or underage, not both. Consequently, we look at a slightly different form of a newsvendor problem, for a price-taker participant offering in electricity …
We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price, determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of producers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of optimal stopping mean-field games, w…
Although the specific structures of electricity markets are diverse around the world, they were all conceived on the premise of predictable, controllable generation with nonnegligible marginal costs. Recent changes, specifically, the increasing renewable integration, have challenged such assumptions. In light of this shift, this thesis intends to devise new frameworks and advance our understanding of the future markets. The first part focuses on mechanism design when the model fully reflects the physics of the grid and the participants. We consider a market that involves continuous goods, gene…
A network model of manufacturing system is considered. This is a network formation game where players are participants of a production process and their actions are their's requests for interaction. Production networks are formed as a result of an interaction. Players' payoff functions are defined on the set of all possible networks. In this paper the special case of network formation games is considered. Payoff functions are supposed to be additive and depend on subsets of arcs. Two cases are considered. First, subsets of arcs are supposed to be not intersected. The necessary and sufficient c…
Energy storage technologies are key to improving grid flexibility in the presence of increasing amounts of intermittent renewable generation. We propose an insurance contract that suitably compensates energy storage systems for providing flexibility. Such a contract provides a wider range of market opportunities for these systems while also incentivizing higher renewable penetration in the grid. We consider a day-ahead market in which generators, including renewables and storage owners, bid to be scheduled for the next operating day. Due to production uncertainty, renewable generators may be u…
Inspired from recent insights into the common ground of machine learning, optimization and decision-making, this paper proposes an easy-to-implement, but effective procedure to enhance both the quality of renewable energy forecasts and the competitive edge of renewable energy producers in electricity markets with a dual-price settlement of imbalances. The quality and economic gains brought by the proposed procedure essentially stem from the utilization of valuable predictors (also known as features) in a data-driven newsvendor model that renders a computationally inexpensive linear program. We…
In energy systems with high shares of weather-driven renewable power sources, gas-fired power plants can serve as a back-up technology to ensure security of supply and provide short-term flexibility. Therefore, a tighter coordination between electricity and natural gas networks is foreseen. In this work, we examine different levels of coordination in terms of system integration and time coupling of trading floors. We propose an integrated operational model for electricity and natural gas systems under uncertain power supply by applying two-stage stochastic programming. This formulation co-opti…
The paper develops a typical management problem of a large power producer (i.e., he can partly influence the market price). In particular, he routinely needs to decide how much of his generation it is preferable to commit to fixed price bilateral contracts (e.g., futures) or to the spot market. However, he also needs to plan how to distribute the production across the different plants under his control. The two decisions, namely the sales-mix and the generation plan, naturally interact, since the opportunity to influence the spot price depends, among other things, by the amount of the energy t…
Carbon-Driven Incentive Mechanism for Renewable Power-to-Ammonia Production in Coupled Carbon and Ammonia Markets
College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University（四川大学电气工程学院）；School of Statistics and Data Science, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics（西南财经大学统计与数据科学学院）；Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University（哈佛大学约翰·A·保尔森工程与应用科学学院）
Interest in sustainability has increased the share of variable renewable energy sources (VRES) in power generation. Energy storage systems' potential to mitigate intermittencies from non-dispatchable VRES has enhanced their appeal. However, the impacts of storage vary based on the owner and market conditions. We examine the policy implications of investments in utility-scale battery storage via a bi-level optimization model. The lower level depicts power system operations, modeled as either perfect competition or Cournot oligopoly to allow for the assessment of producer market power. The upper…
We consider users which may have renewable energy harvesting devices, or distributed generators. Such users can behave as consumer or producer (hence, we denote them as prosumers) at different time instances. A prosumer may sell the energy to other prosumers in exchange of money. We consider a demand response model, where the price of conventional energy depends on the total demand of all the prosumers at a certain time. A prosumer depending on its own utility has to select the amount of energy it wants to buy either from the grid or from other prosumers, or the amount of excess energy it want…
