arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1405.7089q-bio.NC
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意识:这里、那里,但并非无处不在

Consciousness: Here, There but Not Everywhere

Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch

AI总结:

本文提出整合信息理论(IIT)作为意识理论,基于现象学公理推导物理机制属性,解释意识存在与质量,并预测数字计算机即使模拟人脑也几乎无意识。

摘要:

意识科学通过聚焦于经验的行为和神经相关物已取得了巨大进展。然而,如果我们想理解即使是基本的神经学事实,相关物是不够的;在那些我们想知道意识是否存在的情况下,它们也没有多大帮助:例如,仅有几片功能皮层岛的患者、早产婴儿、非哺乳动物物种,以及在驾驶、识别人脸和物体以及回答难题方面迅速超越人类的机器。为了解决这些问题,我们需要一个意识理论,它明确说明经验是什么以及哪种类型的物理系统可以拥有经验。整合信息理论(IIT)正是从意识经验出发,通过存在、组合、信息、整合和排除这五个现象学公理来做到这一点。由此,它推导出关于物理机制必须具备以支持意识的五个属性假设。该理论对个体经验的数量和质量都提供了原则性的解释,并提供了一个演算方法来评估特定机制系统是否有意识以及有什么意识。IIT解释了广泛的临床和实验室发现,做出了可检验的预测,并外推到不寻常的条件。该理论证实了一些泛心论直觉——意识是一种内在的、基本的属性,是分级的,在生物有机体中普遍存在,甚至一些非常简单的系统也有意识。然而,与泛心论不同,IIT暗示并非所有事物都有意识,例如个体群体或前馈网络。与广泛的功能主义信念形成鲜明对比,IIT暗示数字计算机,即使它们的行为在功能上与我们相同,即使它们运行对人脑的忠实模拟,也几乎不会有任何体验。

英文摘要:

The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioral and neuronal correlates of experience. However, correlates are not enough if we are to understand even basic neurological fact; nor are they of much help in cases where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, pre-term infants, non-mammalian species, and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need a theory of consciousness that specifies what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) does so by starting from conscious experience via five phenomenological axioms of existence, composition, information, integration, and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience, and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular system of mechanisms is conscious and of what. IIT explains a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes testable predictions, and extrapolates to unusual conditions. The theory vindicates some panpsychist intuitions -- consciousness is an intrinsic, fundamental property, is graded, is common among biological organisms, and even some very simple systems have some. However, unlike panpsychism, IIT implies that not everything is conscious, for example group of individuals or feed forward networks. In sharp contrast with widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behavior were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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