证伪与自觉
Falsification and consciousness
摘要:
对意识的科学理论的探索应该导致可证伪的理论。然而,在这里,我们表明,证伪是特别有问题的理论的意识。我们正式描述了测试这些理论的标准实验装置。基于理论对某些物理系统(如大脑)的应用,测试需要将理论的预测经验(给定系统的一些内部可观察性,如大脑成像数据)与推断经验(使用报告或行为)进行比较。如果推论和预测之间存在不匹配,那么理论就是被证伪的。我们表明,如果推理和预测是独立的,它遵循任何最低限度的信息理论的意识是自动证伪。这是一个很大的问题,因为这个领域依赖于报告或行为来推断意识体验,这意味着这种独立性,所以这种脆弱性影响了许多当代意识理论。此外,我们表明,如果推理和预测是严格依赖的,它遵循的理论是不可证伪的。这影响了那些声称意识是由报告或行为决定的理论。最后,我们探讨了走出这一困境的可能途径。
英文摘要:
The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。