现象意识状态的丰富性与不可言说性的来源
Sources of Richness and Ineffability for Phenomenally Conscious States
AI总结:
本文提出信息论动力系统框架,将意识丰富性对应信息量、不可言说性对应处理阶段信息损失,以物理主义解释意识体验的这两大难题。
摘要:
意识状态(即处于其中时存在某种感受的状态)似乎既丰富或充满细节,又难以言说或难以完全描述和回忆。特别是不可言说性问题,是哲学中一个长期存在的问题,部分地激发了解释鸿沟:即认为意识不能被还原为潜在的物理过程的信念。在此,我们为意识的丰富性和不可言说性提供了一个信息论动力系统的视角。在我们的框架中,意识体验的丰富性对应于意识状态中的信息量,而不可言说性则对应于不同处理阶段所丢失的信息量。我们描述了工作记忆中的吸引子动力学如何导致对原始体验的贫乏回忆,语言的离散符号性质如何不足以描述体验的丰富且高维的结构,以及两个个体认知功能的相似性如何与他们之间体验的可交流性改善相关联。虽然我们的模型可能无法解决所有与解释鸿沟相关的问题,但它在迈向对意识体验的丰富性和不可言说性的完全物理主义解释方面取得了进展:这两个重要方面似乎构成了定性特征之所以令人困惑的部分原因。
英文摘要:
Conscious states (states that there is something it is like to be in) seem both rich or full of detail, and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience: two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling.
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