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arXiv 1402.3962cs.GTcs.FL
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加权对策中的安全均衡

Secure Equilibria in Weighted Games

Véronique Bruyère, Noémie Meunier, Jean-François Raskin

摘要:

我们考虑两个玩家非零和无限持续时间的加权图上的游戏。我们扩展了Chatterjee等人提出的安全均衡的概念,从布尔设置到这个定量设置。对于布尔设置,我们的安全均衡的概念细化了经典的纳什均衡的概念。我们证明了安全均衡总是存在于一个大类的加权游戏,其中包括共同的措施,如sup,inf,lim sup,lim inf,平均支付,和折扣和。此外,我们表明,可以合成有限的记忆策略配置文件很少的内存。我们还证明了安全平衡点的约束存在性问题对于sup,inf,lim sup,lim inf和平均支付测度是可判定的。我们的解决方案依赖于新的结果,零和定量游戏的字典的目标是有趣的自己的权利。

英文摘要:

We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean setting, our notion of secure equilibrium refines the classical notion of Nash equilibrium. We prove that secure equilibria always exist in a large class of weighted games which includes common measures like sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum. Moreover we show that one can synthesize finite-memory strategy profiles with few memory. We also prove that the constrained existence problem for secure equilibria is decidable for sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf and mean-payoff measures. Our solutions rely on new results for zero-sum quantitative games with lexicographic objectives that are interesting on their own right.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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