Imitative Trust versus Indirect Reciprocity
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Instability of group formation through indirect reciprocity under imperfect information and implementation error
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism behind the evolution of cooperation. Oishi et al. analytically showed the formation of two exclusive groups under the KANDORI assessment rule in the case of perfect information and no implementation error, regardless of the population size $N$. Here, we numerically show the formation of many exclusive groups under the JUDGING assessment rule in the same case. Introducing degrees of exclusive groups, we numerically examine the stability of the group formation under imperfect information and implementation error.
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硬币的另一面：接受者规范及其对间接互惠与合作的影响
The Other Side of the Coin: Recipient Norms and Their Impact on Indirect Reciprocity and Cooperation
本文通过捐赠博弈引入捐赠者与接受者声誉更新的时间尺度参数，并结合流言群体分析，揭示不同接受者规范在促进合作与抵御背叛者入侵之间的权衡。
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Balanced-imbalanced transitions in indirect reciprocity dynamics on networks
Here we investigate the dynamics of indirect reciprocity on networks, a type of social dynamics in which the attitude of individuals, either cooperative or antagonistic, toward other individuals changes over time by their actions and mutual monitoring. We observe an absorbing state phase transition as we change the network's link or edge density. When the edge density is either small or large enough, opinions quickly reach an absorbing state, from which opinions never change anymore once reached. In contrast, if the edge density is in the middle range the absorbing state is not reached and the…
physics.soc-ph
间接互惠作为弱平衡的动力学
Indirect reciprocity as a dynamics for weak balance
本研究提出间接互惠中的“judging”规范可作为实现社会网络弱结构平衡的动力学规则，通过分析完全图中的集群动力学，揭示了稳态下集群大小分布及规范与宏观群体结构的相互作用。
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Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a n…
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基于策略声誉的刻板印象使间接互惠中的合作模式多样化
Stereotyping by strategy standing diversifies cooperation patterns in indirect reciprocity
Beihang University（北京航空航天大学）；Dartmouth College（达特茅斯学院）
本文提出一种基于策略整体声誉水平的刻板印象框架，证明该机制能产生大量新的进化稳定合作规范-策略对，并识别出八个高合作性的“领先八人对应物”策略对。
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集体声誉下公共物品博弈中的间接互惠
Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations
本文通过将集体声誉评估引入公共物品博弈，研究群体层面间接互惠的演化，发现适度严格的社会评估标准最有利于领先八策略打破社会困境并维持合作。
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间接互惠超越 pairwise 互动
Indirect reciprocity beyond pairwise interactions
Beihang University（北京航空航天大学）；Beijing Academy of Blockchain and Edge Computing（北京区块链与边缘计算研究院）
研究提出多玩家间接互惠框架，揭示群体合作的稳定原则，并展示群体结构对声誉动态的影响，为人工智能中的合作对齐提供基准。
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Voting by Hands Promotes Institutionalised Monitoring in Indirect Reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is a leading mechanism driving human cooperation, where monitoring of behaviour and sharing reputation-related information are crucial. Because collecting information is costly, a tragedy of the commons can arise, with some individuals free-riding on information supplied by others. This can be overcome by organising monitors that aggregate information, supported by fees from their information users. We analyse a co-evolutionary model of individuals playing a social dilemma game and monitors watching them; monitors provide information and players vote fo…
physics.soc-ph
Group Formation through Indirect Reciprocity
The emergence of structure in cooperative relation is studied in a game theoretical model. It is proved that specific types of reciprocity norm lead individuals to split into two groups. The condition for the evolutionary stability of the norms is also revealed. This result suggests a connection between group formation and a specific type of reciprocity norm in our society.
cs.SInlin.AOphysics.soc-ph
连续间接互惠中突变的二阶效应
Second-order effects of mutation in continuous indirect reciprocity
本研究通过连续间接互惠模型对领先八者规范下的突变进行二阶分析，发现允许拒绝与声誉不佳者合作并认可其间的合作可减小突变影响。
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Human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity
During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex networks. In this context, the Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes depending on the details of the network. We here report that when one takes into account the real behavior of people observed in the experiments, both at the mean-field level and on utterly different networks the observed level of cooperation is the same. We thus show that when human subjects interact in an heterogeneous mi…
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高成本惩罚在低背叛可检测性下维持间接互惠
Costly punishment sustains indirect reciprocity under low defection detectability
本研究针对间接互惠下高成本惩罚的有效性争议，引入背叛被误判为合作的感知误差开展理论分析，发现低背叛可检测性下含高成本惩罚的规范是最高效的演化稳定策略，明确了其在促进合作中的关键作用。
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综合间接互惠下合作与多样性的演化
The evolution of cooperation and diversity by integrated indirect reciprocity
本研究提出整合上下游间接互惠的新模型，通过演化博弈论分析，发现可促进利他者与搭便车者稳定共存，且考虑注意力不集中可增强均衡稳定性，为维持社会多样性提供机制解释。
cs.CYnlin.AOphysics.soc-ph
Evolution of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on a bipartite network
Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation.Thanks to gossip, reputations are built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip is allegedly undermined by the fact that it is more error-prone that direct observation, whereas ostracism could be ineffective if the partner selection mechanism is not robust. The aim of this work is to investigate the conditions under which the combination of gossip and ostracism might support cooperation in groups of different sizes. We are also interested in exploring t…
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Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge, following their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are "good" or "bad" according to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules, stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as observed when all members in the population know all about others' behaviors (public information case) and when the members neve…
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Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
Indirect reciprocity in which players cooperate with unacquainted other players having good reputations is a mechanism for cooperation in relatively large populations subjected to social dilemma situations. When the population has group structure, as is often found in social networks, players in experiments are considered to show behavior that deviates from existing theoretical models of indirect reciprocity. First, players often show ingroup favoritism (i.e., cooperation only within the group) rather than full cooperation (i.e., cooperation within and across groups), even though the latter is…
cs.SIphysics.soc-phq-bio.PE
A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms
Although various norms for reciprocity-based cooperation have been suggested that are evolutionarily stable against invasion from free riders, the process of alternation of norms and the role of diversified norms remain unclear in the evolution of cooperation. We clarify the co-evolutionary dynamics of norms and cooperation in indirect reciprocity and also identify the indispensable norms for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the gene knockout method, a genetic engineering technique, we developed the norm knockout method and clarified the norms necessary for the establishment of cooper…
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Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
Evaluation relationships are pivotal for maintaining a cooperative society. A formation of the evaluation relationships has been discussed in terms of indirect reciprocity, by modeling dynamics of good or bad reputations among individuals. Recently, a situation that individuals independently evaluate others with errors (i.e., noisy and private reputation) is considered, where the reputation structure (from what proportion of individuals in the population each receives good reputations, defined as goodness here) becomes complex, and thus has been studied mainly with numerical simulations. The p…
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完全图中间接互惠的精确集群动力学
Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs
本文研究完全图中leading eight规范的间接互惠集群动力学，证明Stern Judging随群体增大几乎必然导致两派敌对分隔，而L4的细微评价差异可促成普遍合作。
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不完全声誉信息与间接互惠中的惩罚
Incomplete Reputation Information and Punishment in Indirect Reciprocity
Pukyong National University（釜庆国立大学）；RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Science (iTHEMS)（理化学研究所交叉理论数学科学中心（iTHEMS））；RIKEN Center for Computational Science（理化学研究所计算科学中心）
本文研究了间接互惠中不完全信息对合作的影响，发现声誉模糊会阻碍合作，而观察不完整不影响合作条件，同时探讨了惩罚在维持合作中的作用。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
我们都认为你做错了——共识如何塑造并被间接互惠所塑造
We both think you did wrong -- How agreement shapes and is shaped by indirect reciprocity
School Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University（蒂斯赛德大学计算、工程与数字技术学院）
研究探讨了共识如何影响并被间接互惠塑造，揭示了道德判断系统如何在个体独立评估时产生高共识，并分析了其对合作行为的影响。
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The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social norms that discriminate the good (those who deserve to be rewarded with help) and the bad (those who should be punished by refusal of help). Despite intensive research, however, there is no definitive consensus on what social norms best promote cooperation through indirect reciprocity, and it remains unclear even how those who refuse to help the bad should be assessed. Here, we propose a new simple norm called "Stayin…
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Evolutionary stability and resistance to cheating in an indirect reciprocity model based on reputation
Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions on their opponent's reputation gained in past interactions with other players (moral assessment). The combination of actions and moral assessment leads to a large diversity of strategies, thus determining the stability of any of them against invasions by all the others is a difficult task. We use a variant of a previously introduced reputation-based model t…
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
噪声与私有评估下间接互惠中合作的演化稳定性
Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
本文首次从理论上证明间接互惠合作在私有评估下可演化稳定，发现简单常设（SS）规范稳定而严厉评判（SJ）不稳定，揭示适度简单性是维持合作的关键。
cs.GTcs.MAmath.OC
Groupwise information sharing promotes ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations, in which an individual is motivated to help another to acquire a good reputation and receive help from others afterwards. Ingroup favoritism is another aspect of human cooperation, whereby individuals help members in their own group more often than those in other groups. Ingroup favoritism is a puzzle for the theory of cooperation because it is not easily evolutionarily stable. In the context of indirect reciprocity, ingroup favoritism has been shown to be a consequence of employing a double standard when assigni…
cs.SIphysics.soc-phq-bio.PE
局部与全局互惠模型
A model of local and global reciprocity
University of Pennsylvania（宾夕法尼亚大学）；RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Science (iTHEMS)（理化学研究所交叉理论与数学科学中心(iTHEMS)）；RIKEN Center for Computational Science（理化学研究所计算科学中心）；Saitama University（埼玉大学）
通过区分局部直接互惠和全局间接互惠，建立数学模型，发现结合两者能解决评分困境，且宽容策略可维持合作。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
意见同步下的间接互惠
Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization
本文提出统一框架整合公共与私人评价模型，证明间接互惠中合作的稳定性取决于个体意见的相关性，并指出意见统计独立时不存在演化稳定的合作规范。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
通过环境反馈的间接互惠
Indirect Reciprocity with Environmental Feedback
Beihang University（北京航空航天大学）；Zhongguancun Laboratory（中关村实验室）；State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, BIGAI（通用人工智能全国重点实验室）
本文提出了一种共进化框架，通过环境反馈机制降低合作阈值，促进从低合作到稳定高合作的转变，揭示了声誉机构与环境约束耦合系统的进化动态。
math.DSphysics.soc-phq-bio.PE
A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity
Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputati…
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
噪声与私有评估下间接互惠中“领先八项”规范促进合作的演化稳定性
Evolutionary stability of cooperation by the leading eight norms in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
该研究提出新方法分析私有评估下的声誉结构，通过“善良度”和“自我声誉”两变量探讨“领先八项”社会规范的演化稳定性，揭示了实现高水平合作的关键枢纽。
cs.GTcs.MAphysics.soc-ph
随机规则下的间接互惠
Indirect reciprocity with stochastic rules
本研究扩展间接互惠的领先八规则框架，引入随机规范和更新接受者声誉，刻画了在公共信息下导致完全合作的进化稳定规范，并揭示了稳定性与错误鲁棒性之间的权衡。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
Exploring the cooperative regimes in a model of agents without memory or "tags": indirect reciprocity vs. selfish incentives
The self-organization in cooperative regimes in a simple mean-field version of a model based on "selfish" agents which play the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game is studied. The agents have no memory and use strategies not based on direct reciprocity nor 'tags'. Two variables are assigned to each agent $i$ at time $t$, measuring its capital $C(i;t)$ and its probability of cooperation $p(i;t)$. At each time step $t$ a pair of agents interact by playing the PD game. These 2 agents update their probability of cooperation $p(i)$ as follows: they compare the profits they made in this interaction $δC(i;t…
cond-matcs.CEhep-lat
上游互惠与下游互惠：催化合作
Upstream reciprocity versus downstream reciprocity: Catalyzing cooperation
Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur（坎普尔印度理工学院）
通过基于智能体的模拟，研究上游（经验驱动）和下游（声誉驱动）互惠在有限和结构化群体中的联合动态，发现更新机制对两者命运起决定性作用，并揭示最大化上游互惠的最优网络度。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
流言、声誉与合作的机制模型
A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation
本文构建基于流言的间接互惠机制模型，证明两类流言形式数学等价，推导稳定合作所需的最小流言量，并分析成本收益、社会规范、误差及有偏流言的影响。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
当道德判断与道德行为一致时，合作得以繁荣
Cooperation thrives when moral judgment matches moral conduct
Toulouse School of Economics（图卢兹经济学院）；Monash University（莫纳什大学）
本研究通过评估所有1,048,576个道德系统，发现稳定合作需“区分性”策略与“一致性”规范配对，其中“悔悟的区分者”在各类社会困境中普遍稳定，揭示道德一致性是间接互惠合作的核心。
physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
Partner selection supports reputation-based cooperation in a Public Goods Game
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers' history of giving has a significant impact on the donor's decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small am…
cs.SIphysics.soc-ph
