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arXiv 1301.5992physics.soc-phq-bio.PE
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基于声誉的间接互惠模型的演化稳定性和抗欺骗性

Evolutionary stability and resistance to cheating in an indirect reciprocity model based on reputation

Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero, José A. Cuesta

摘要:

间接互惠是解释利他主义在社会中产生和维持的主要机制之一。间接互惠的标准方法是声誉模型。在这些游戏中,玩家根据对手在过去与其他玩家的互动中获得的声誉(道德评估)做出决定。行动和道德评估的结合导致了大量的策略多样性,因此确定其中任何一个的稳定性对所有其他人的入侵是一项艰巨的任务。我们使用之前介绍的基于声誉的模型的一个变体,让我们系统地分析所有这些入侵,并确定哪些是成功的。因此,我们能够确定进化稳定的三阶策略(除了行动之外,还考虑捐赠者和接受者的声誉)。我们的研究结果表明,如果一个策略抵抗了任何其他具有相同道德评价的策略的入侵,那么它就可以抵抗任何其他策略的入侵。然而,如果行为并不总是被目击,作弊者(即,具有背叛概率而不考虑对手声誉的个体)有机会击败对于欺骗概率和被目击概率的某些选择的稳定策略。值得注意的是,通过分析这个问题与自适应动力学,我们发现,一个诚实的人口是否抵制入侵的骗子是由一个类似汉密尔顿的规则-的概率,作弊被发现扮演的角色的相关性参数。

英文摘要:

Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions on their opponent's reputation gained in past interactions with other players (moral assessment). The combination of actions and moral assessment leads to a large diversity of strategies, thus determining the stability of any of them against invasions by all the others is a difficult task. We use a variant of a previously introduced reputation-based model that let us systematically analyze all these invasions and determine which ones are successful. Accordingly we are able to identify the third-order strategies (those which, apart from the action, judge considering both the reputation of the donor and that of the recipient) that are evolutionarily stable. Our results reveal that if a strategy resists the invasion of any other one sharing its same moral assessment, it can resist the invasion of any other strategy. However, if actions are not always witnessed, cheaters (i.e., individuals with a probability of defecting regardless of the opponent's reputation) have a chance to defeat the stable strategies for some choices of the probabilities of cheating and of being witnessed. Remarkably, by analyzing this issue with adaptive dynamics we find that whether a honest population resists the invasion of cheaters is determined by a Hamilton-like rule---with the probability that the cheat is discovered playing the role of the relatedness parameter.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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