Comment on "Quantum dense key distribution"
英文摘要:
In this Comment we question the security of recently proposed by Degiovanni et al. [Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 032310] scheme of quantum dense key distribution.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。
Antoni Wojcik
In this Comment we question the security of recently proposed by Degiovanni et al. [Phys. Rev. A 69 (2004) 032310] scheme of quantum dense key distribution.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。
继续探索
In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.
In a recent Brief Report, Lee et al. [L. Lee, D. Ahn, and S.W. Hwang, Phys. Rev. A 66, 024304 (2002)] have claimed that using pairwise entangled qubits gives rise to an exponentially more efficient dense coding when two parties are involved than using maximally entangled qubits shared among N parties. Here, we show that their claim is not true.
Comment on Phys. Rev. A 79, 052312 (2009), http://pra.aps.org/abstract/PRA/v79/i5/e052312
In a recent paper [A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 (2000)], a quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure if Eve use a special strategy to attack.
In a recent comment \cite{ch1} it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed in \cite{zhang} and its generalization to d-level systems in \cite{v1} are insecure against an attack devised by the authors of the comment. We invalidate the arguments of the comment and show that the protocols are still secure.
We address criticism of the Letter "Exposed-Key Weakness of $αη$" in the Comment by Nair and Yuen. The Comment claims that the Letter does not show insecurity of $αη$ because our approximation for the eavesdropper's entropy on the encrypted key is invalid. We present simulations which show that, on the contrary, our estimate is in close agreement with numerical calculations of the actual entropy over the applicable domain. We additionally discuss some ways in which our views on security requirements differ from the views given in the Comment.
In a recent paper [J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 5 (2003) 155-157], a quantum key distribution scheme based on entanglement swapping was proposed, which exhibited two improvements over the previous protocols. In this Comment, it is shown that the scheme has no properties as been discussed.
In this comment, we present a frequency-shift attack on "quantum key distribution with classical Bob". This practical attack should also be considered in other two-way quantum key distribution protocols.
In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331(2002)], an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for d-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.
Please goto the "Note Added" part of v6, quant-ph/0501143
This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.
In a Letter, Cabello proposed a quantum key distribution (QKD) Protocol which attended to Holevo limit. In this comment, we show that Eve could use a simple plan to distinguish among quantum keys, without being detected by Alice and Bob. In following, we show that our approach is not restricted to Cabello Protocol. With attention to our Eavesdropping approach, it seems that Mor's arguments for no-cloning principal for orthogonal states is not general enough to avoid eavesdropping.
In the paper [Zhang, Li and Guo, Phys. Rev. A 64, 024302 (2001)], a quantum key distribution protocol based on quantum encryption was proposed, in which the quantum key can be reused. However, it is shown that, if Eve employs a special strategy to attack, this protocol becomes insecure because of the reused quantum key. That is, Eve can elicit partial information about the key bits without being detected. Finally, a possible improvement of the Zhang-Li-Guo protocol is proposed.
As Fahmi and Golshani correctly point out, a protocol introduced in A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5635 (2000), to show that a quantum key distribution protocol can have efficiency one (i.e., can achieve the Holevo limit), does indeed not have efficiency one. The corrected protocol, introduced in A. Cabello, Recent. Res. Devel. Physics 2, 249 (2001), is reproduced here.
We show an eavesdropping scheme, by which the eavesdropper can achieve the full information of the key against the protocol [Kye et al., PRL 95 040501 (2005)] with a probability of unity and will not be discovered by the the legitimate users, even in the case that they have the perfect single-photon source and the loseless channel.
In this manuscript we discuss the device-independent conference key agreement (DICKA) protocol [Phys. Rev. A 97, 022307 (2018)]. We show that the suggested honest implementation fails, because perfect correlated measurement results and the required Bell-inequality violation cannot be achieved simultaneously, in contradiction to what is claimed. We further show via semidefinite programming that there cannot exist any suitable honest implementation in the tripartite setting, rendering the DICKA protocol incomplete.
Recently, in Sci. Rep. \textbf{6} (2016) 28767, Li et al., have proposed a scheme for quantum key distribution using Bell states. This comment provides a proof that the proposed scheme of Li et al., is insecure as it involves leakage of information. Further, it is also shown that all the error rates computed in the Li et al.'s paper are incorrect as the authors failed to recognize the fact that any eavesdropping effort will lead to entanglement swapping. Finally, it is established that Li et al.'s scheme can be viewed as an incrementally (but incorrectly)modified version of the existing scheme…
We show that the insecurity claim of the AlphaEta cryptosystem made by C. Ahn and K. Birnbaum in Phys. Lett. A 370 (2007) 131-135 under heterodyne attack is based on invalid extrapolations of Shannon's random cipher analysis and on an invalid statistical independence assumption. We show, both for standard ciphers and AlphaEta, that expressions of the kind given by Ahn and Birnbaum can at best be interpreted as security lower bounds.
Designing a quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol is always a challenging task, because both the security and the fairness properties have to be considered simultaneously. Recently, Zhu et al. (Quantum Inf Process 14(11): 4245-4254) pointed out that Shukla et al.'s QKA protocol (Quantum Inf Process 13(11): 2391-2405) has some security flaws (which lead to the Participant Attack). Moreover, they proposed an improvement to avoid these weaknesses. However this study points out that the improved protocol also suffers from a colluding attack, i.e., two dishonest participants in the protocol can coll…
We respond to a comment on our high-speed technique for the implementation of free-space quantum key distribution (QKD). The model used in the comment assigns inappropriately high link losses to the technique in question. We show that the use of reasonable loss parameters in the model invalidates the comment's main conclusion and highlights the benefits of increased transmission rates.
Recently Boyer and Mor pointed out the first conclusion of Lemma 1 in our original paper is not correct, and therefore, the proof of Theorem 5 based on Lemma 1 is wrong. Furthermore, they gave a direct proof for Theorem 5 and affirmed the conclusions in our original paper. In this reply, we admit the first conclusion of Lemma 1 is not correct, but we need to point out the second conclusion of Lemma 1 is correct. Accordingly, all the proofs for Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Theorems 3--6 are only based on the the second conclusion of Lemma 1 and therefore are correct.
The main claim by H.K. Lo et al that they have for the first time made the decoy-state method efficiently work in practice is inappropriate. We show that, prior to our work, actually (and obviously) none of proposals raised by H.K. Lo et al can really work in practice. Their main protocol requires infinite number of different coherent states which is in principle impossible for any set-up. Their idea of using very weak coherent state as decoy state doesn't work either by our detailed analysis. The idea implicitly requires an unreasonablly large number of pulses which needs at least 14 days to …
In a recent paper [1] (also at http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/0803.3721), I made several critical remarks on a 'Hermitian time operator' proposed by Galapon [2] (also at http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0111061). Galapon has correctly pointed out that remarks pertaining to 'denseness' of the commutator domain are wrong [3]. However, the other remarks still apply, and it is further noted that a given quantum system can be a member of this domain only at a set of times of total measure zero.
Kang et al. [Chin. Phys. B 24 (2015) 090306] proposed a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication protocol. We find that the proposed protocol is not secure, that is, Charlie can eavesdrop the shared keys between Alice and Bob without being detected.
We analyze the significance for quantum key distribution (QKD) of free-space quantum communications results reported in a recent paper (J. C. Bienfang et al., quant-ph/0405097, hereafter referred to as "Bienfang et al."), who contrast the quantum communications rate of their partial QKD implementation (which does not produce cryptographically useful shared, secret keys) over a short transmission distance, with the secret bit rates of previous full QKD implementations over much longer distances. We show that when a cryptographically relevant comparison with previous results is made, the system …
We show that the criticism of a recent comment \cite{ch2} on the insecurity of a quantum secret sharing protocol proposed in \cite{v2} is based on a misconception about the meaning of security and hence is invalid. The same misconception also appears in another comment of the authors \cite{ch1} on the security of an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol \cite{zhang,v1}.
This paper proposes a new protocol for quantum dense key distribution. This protocol embeds the benefits of a quantum dense coding and a quantum key distribution and is able to generate shared secret keys four times more efficiently than BB84 one. We hereinafter prove the security of this scheme against individual eavesdropping attacks, and we present preliminary experimental results, showing its feasibility.
The capacity of the quantum dense key distribution (QDKD) [Phys. Rev. A69, 032310 (2004)] is doubled by introducing the dense coding. The security of the improved QDKD against eavesdropping is pointed out to be easily proven. In both the original QDKD and the present improved QDKD, a strategy to double the efficiency of generating the secret key with given length is proposed. In addition, we point out a leak of security of the original QDKD and fix it.
A simple proof of a key inequality required by the paper's analysis is presented. An introductory section discussing the paper's setup may be helpful to some readers. An alternative statistical analysis is suggested.
We reply to the Comment made in arXiv:1107.4435v1 [quant-ph] (Phys. Lett. A \textbf{374} (2010) 1097) by noting some erroneous considerations therein resulting in a misleading view of the quantum key distribution protocol in question. We then correct the rates provided for the Intercept-and-Resend attack and we complete the analysis of Eve's attack based on a double CNOT gate.
We argue with claims of the paper [Agostini F., Caprara S. and Ciccotti G., Europhys. Lett. EPL, 78 (2007) Art. 30001, 6] that the quantum-classic bracket introduced in [arXiv:quant-ph/0506122] produces "artificial coupling" and has "genuinely classical nature". Keywords: p-mechanics, quantum, classic, commutator, Poisson bracket, mixing, coupling, semi-classical
The first two party Quantum Key Agreement (QKA) protocol, based on quantum teleportation, was proposed by Zhou et al. (Electronics Letters 40.18 (2004): 1149-1150). In this protocol, to obtain the key bit string, one of the parties use a device to obtain inner product of two quantum states, one being unknown, and the other one performs Bell measurement. However, in this article, we show that it is not possible to obtain a device that would output the inner product of two qubits even when only one of the qubit is unknown. This is so because existence of such device would imply perfectly disting…
In a recent letter, Barbosa et al [PRL 90, 227901(2003)] claim that secure communication is possible with bright coherent pulses, by using quantum noise to hide the data from an eavesdropper. We show here that the secrecy in the scheme of Barbosa et al is unrelated to quantum noise, but rather derives from the secret key that sender and receiver share beforehand.
The question raised by [Bastin and Martin 2003 J. Phys. B: At. Mol. Opt. Phys. 36, 4201] is examined and used to explain in more detail a key point of our calculations. They have sought to rebut criticisms raised by us of certain techniques used in the calculation of the off-resonance case. It is also explained why this result is not a problem for the off-resonance case, but, on the contrary, opens the door to a general situation. Their comment is based on a blatant misunderstanding of our proposal and as such is simply wrong.
We demonstrate quantum key distribution (QKD) with bidirectional 10 Gb/s classical data channels in a single fiber using dense wavelength division multiplexing. Record secure key rates of 2.38 Mbps and fiber distances up to 70 km are achieved. Data channels are simultaneously monitored for error-free operation. The robustness of QKD is further demonstrated with a secure key rate of 445 kbps over 25 km, obtained in the presence of data lasers launching conventional 0 dBm power. We discuss the fundamental limit for the QKD performance in the multiplexing environment.
Recently, Pawlowski [Phys. Rev. A 82, 032313 (2010)] claimed to have proven the security of a quantum key distribution by using only the monogamy of Bell's inequality violations. In the proof, however, he tacitly assumed that the eavesdropper's outcome is binary. The assumption cannot be justified because Eve's (eavesdropper's) power can only be limited by natural principle. We provide a counter-example for a step of the proof.
Comment on "Provably Trainable Rotationally Equivariant Quantum Machine Learning"
评论指出West等人论文中动力学李代数构造存在不一致,将固定CZ门误作参数化门,建议用修正的DLA重新分析。
We proposed a scheme of continuous-variable quantum key distribution, in which the bright Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled optical beams are utilized. The source of the entangled beams is placed inside the receiving station, where half of the entangled beams are transmitted with round trip and the other half are retained by the receiver. The amplitude and phase signals modulated on the signal beam by the sender are simultaneously extracted by the authorized receiver with the scheme of the dense-coding correlation measurement for continuous quantum variables, thus the channel capacity is signi…
Nishioka et al claim in [1], elaborating on their earlier paper [2], that the direct encryption scheme called Y-00 [3,4] is equivalent to a classical non-random additive stream cipher, and thus offers no more security than the latter. In this paper, we show that this claim is false and that Y-00 may be considered equivalent to a \emph{random} cipher. We explain why a random cipher provides additional security compared to its nonrandom counterpart. Some criticisms in [1] on the use of Y-00 for key generation are also briefly responded to.
Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a simple and effective attack, i.e. the dense-coding attack. It is shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and performing collective measurements after Alice's encoding. The attack process is just like a dense-coding communic…
We present two robust quantum key distribution protocols against two kinds of collective noise, following some ideas in quantum dense coding. Three-qubit entangled states are used as quantum information carriers, two of which forming the logical qubit which is invariant with a special type of collective noise. The information is encoded on logical qubits with four unitary operations, which can be read out faithfully with Bell-state analysis on two physical qubits and a single-photon measurement on the other physical qubit, not three-photon joint measurements. Two bits of information are exchan…
Yuan and Shields claim that our data-encryption protocol is entirely equivalent to a classical stream cipher utilizing no quantum phenomena. Their claim is, indeed, false. Yuan and Shields also claim that schemes similar to the one presented in Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 227901 are not suitable for key generation. This claim is also refuted. In any event, we welcome the opportunity to clarify the situation for a wider audience.
We observe that the comment of [1, arXiv:2302.07897] is consistent with [2] on key points: i) the microscopic mechanism of the experimentally observed teleportation is size winding and ii) the system thermalizes and scrambles at the time of teleportation. These properties are consistent with a gravitational interpretation of the teleportation dynamics, as opposed to the late-time dynamics. The objections of [1] concern counterfactual scenarios outside of the experimentally implemented protocol.
Reply to Comment on "Controlling the Dynamical Evolution of Quantum Coherence and Quantum Correlations in $e^{+}e^{-} \to Λ\barΛ$ Processes at BESIII"
该研究回应相关评论,采用关联量子通道描述BESIII上e⁺e⁻→ΛΛ̄过程的自旋演化,评估量子导引并研究其在不同量子通道下的演化特性。
This brief note in response to Wojciech Zurek's article "Quantum Darwinism, classical reality, and the randomness of quantum jumps" (Physics Today, October 2014, page 44) points out extant rebuttals in the literature to some of the author's key claims.
We propose a high-efficiency three-party quantum key agreement protocol, by utilizing two-photon polarization-entangled Bell states and a few single-photon polarization states as the information carriers, and we use the quantum dense coding method to improve its efficiency. In this protocol, each participant performs one of four unitary operations to encode their sub-secret key on the passing photons which contain two parts, the first quantum qubits of Bell states and a small number of single-photon states. At the end of this protocol, based on very little information announced by other, all p…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to establish a secret key over a potentially hostile channel by exchanging photonic quantum states, relying on the fact that it is impossible for an eavesdropper to tap the quantum channel without disturbing these photons in a way that can be detected [1]. Here we introduce a large-alphabet QKD protocol that makes optimal use of temporal and spectral correlations of entangled photons, reaching the maximum number of inde- pendent basis states (the Schmidt number) and enabling extremely high information content per photon together with an optima…
A theoretical study of subcarrier-wave quantum key distribution system integration with an optical transport network utilizing dense wavelength division multiplexing
本文理论研究了DWDM光传输网络中SCW QKD的性能,考虑拉曼散射、四波混频等噪声,计算了QBER和安全密钥率,发现1310 nm波长优于C波段。
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