高能物理中的贝叶斯推理与常规统计
Bayesian reasoning versus conventional statistics in High Energy Physics
摘要：
物理学家在不确定性条件下的直觉推理更接近贝叶斯方法，而不是大学教授的频率论思想，后者被认为是处理统计问题的参考框架。直觉和传统统计学的结合使从业者能够得到非常接近的结果，无论是在意义上还是在数值上，至少在简单的常规应用中，这些结果是通过贝叶斯方法获得的。然而，在某些情况下，“任意”概率反演会产生不可接受或误导性的结果，在这些情况下，有意识地应用贝叶斯推理就变得至关重要。从这些考虑出发，我最后将评论经常争论的问题：“有没有可能所有的物理学家都成为贝叶斯？”''
英文摘要：
The intuitive reasoning of physicists in conditions of uncertainty is closer to the Bayesian approach than to the frequentist ideas taught at University and which are considered the reference framework for handling statistical problems. The combination of intuition and conventional statistics allows practitioners to get results which are very close, both in meaning and in numerical value, to those obtainable by Bayesian methods, at least in simple routine applications. There are, however, cases in which ``arbitrary'' probability inversions produce unacceptable or misleading results and in these cases the conscious application of Bayesian reasoning becomes crucial. Starting from these considerations, I will finally comment on the often debated question: ``is there any chance that all physicists will become Bayesian?''
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