杰弗里斯先验与经验丰富的物理学家先验-反对客观贝叶斯理论的论点
Jeffreys priors versus experienced physicist priors - arguments against objective Bayesian theory
摘要：
我审查的问题的选择的先验从物理学家的角度感兴趣的测量一个物理量，我试图表明，参考先验往往建议的目的（杰弗里斯先验）不适合的问题。虽然这看起来令人惊讶，但对于一个“有经验的物理学家”来说，在没有明确使用贝叶斯定理的情况下，更容易接受主观的先验知识，甚至是纯粹主观的概率推断。使用参考先验的问题是在“贝叶斯教条主义”的更一般的背景下设置的，这可能会真正伤害贝叶斯主义。
英文摘要：
I review the problem of the choice of the priors from the point of view of a physicist interested in measuring a physical quantity, and I try to show that the reference priors often recommended for the purpose (Jeffreys priors) do not fit to the problem. Although it may seem surprising, it is easier for an ``experienced physicist'' to accept subjective priors, or even purely subjective elicitation of probabilities, without explicit use of the Bayes' theorem. The problem of the use of reference priors is set in the more general context of ``Bayesian dogmatism'', which could really harm Bayesianism.
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