量子博弈论与开放存取出版
Quantum Game Theory and Open Access Publishing
摘要：
信息时代的数字革命，特别是计算机技术和新的通信技术带来的科学传播方式的巨大变化，使全球范围内的高质量科学信息得以免费提供。例如，arXiv是领先的科学交流平台，主要针对数学和物理，世界上每个人都可以免费访问。虽然在某些科学学科中，开放获取方式已经成功实现，但其他学科（例如人文科学和社会科学）仍然停留在传统的道路上，尽管这些社区的许多科学家都赞同开放获取原则。在本文中，我们试图用博弈论的方法来解释这些不同的出版模式。基于这样的假设，即科学家的主要目标是最大化他们的声誉，我们模拟不同的可能的游戏设置，即零和游戏，囚徒困境的情况下，和一个版本的猎鹿游戏，这表明科学家属于“非开放获取社区”的困境。从个体的角度来看，他们没有动机偏离传统出版的纳什均衡。通过使用量子博弈论方法扩展模型，可以表明，如果纠缠强度超过一定值，科学家将克服困境，并终止在所有三种设置中仅以传统方式发表。
英文摘要：
The digital revolution of the information age and in particular the sweeping changes of scientific communication brought about by computing and novel communication technology, potentiate global, high grade scientific information for free. The arXiv for example is the leading scientific communication platform, mainly for mathematics and physics, where everyone in the world has free access on. While in some scientific disciplines the open access way is successfully realized, other disciplines (e.g. humanities and social sciences) dwell on the traditional path, even though many scientists belonging to these communities approve the open access principle. In this paper we try to explain these different publication patterns by using a game theoretical approach. Based on the assumption, that the main goal of scientists is the maximization of their reputation, we model different possible game settings, namely a zero sum game, the prisoners' dilemma case and a version of the stag hunt game, that show the dilemma of scientists belonging to ''non-open access communities''. From an individual perspective, they have no incentive to deviate from the Nash Equilibrium of traditional publishing. By extending the model using the quantum game theory approach it can be shown, that if the strength of entanglement exceeds a certain value, the scientists will overcome the dilemma and terminate to publish only traditionally in all three settings.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
