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arXiv cs/0607146cs.CRcs.LO
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安全协议分析中的攻击者逻辑建模

Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis

Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella

摘要:

安全协议分析的逻辑需要形式化的对手模型,指定对手的能力。一个常见的模型是Dolev-Yao模型,它只考虑能够编写和重放消息并使用已知密钥解密的对手。Dolev-Yao模型是一个有用的抽象,但它有一些缺点:它不能处理知道协议特定信息的对手,也不能处理概率概念,例如对手试图猜测密钥。我们展示了如何使用一个逻辑与算法知识的概念,我们可以分析不同的对手模型下的安全协议。粗略地说,假设对手使用算法来计算他们的知识;对手的能力是通过对所使用的算法进行适当的限制来捕获的。我们展示了如何在这种情况下对标准的Dolev-Yao对手进行建模,以及如何捕获更一般的能力,包括特定于协议的知识和猜测。

英文摘要:

Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay messages, and decipher them with known keys. The Dolev-Yao model is a useful abstraction, but it suffers from some drawbacks: it cannot handle the adversary knowing protocol-specific information, and it cannot handle probabilistic notions, such as the adversary attempting to guess the keys. We show how we can analyze security protocols under different adversary models by using a logic with a notion of algorithmic knowledge. Roughly speaking, adversaries are assumed to use algorithms to compute their knowledge; adversary capabilities are captured by suitable restrictions on the algorithms used. We show how we can model the standard Dolev-Yao adversary in this setting, and how we can capture more general capabilities including protocol-specific knowledge and guesses.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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