AI 中文总结
该研究无条件证明了Yamakawa-Zhandry可验证随机性协议的安全性，无需依赖Aaronson-Ambainis猜想，且针对对随机预言进行最多o(log λ)次适应性量子查询的浅查询量子敌手。
AI 中文摘要
在近期的突破性研究中，Yamakawa与Zhandry（《ACM期刊2024》）在量子随机预言模型（QROM）中构建了量子性证明，其中量子证明者对公开可计算函数H采样码字原像。他们推测，给定任意H，成功的证明者必须从可能答案的高熵分布中采样其原像；若该推测成立，将为量子随机预言模型提供可验证随机性协议。作为该推测的部分证据，二人在假设Aaronson-Ambainis猜想成立的前提下，证明了其可验证随机性协议的安全性。我们无条件证明了Yamakawa-Zhandry可验证随机性协议的安全性，无需依赖未被证明的Aaronson-Ambainis猜想，且针对低查询深度量子敌手——具体而言，是对随机预言进行最多o(log λ)次适应性量子查询的敌手。
英文摘要
In a recent breakthrough, Yamakawa and Zhandry (J. ACM 2024) constructed a proof of quantumness in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) in which the quantum prover samples a codeword preimage of a publicly computable function H. They conjectured that given any H, a successful prover must sample their preimage from a high-entropy distribution over possible answers. If true, this would give a certifiable randomness protocol in the quantum random oracle model. As partial evidence for their conjecture, Yamakawa and Zhandry proved the security of their certifiable randomness protocol assuming the Aaronson-Ambainis conjecture. We prove the security of the certifiable randomness protocol of Yamakawa-Zhandry unconditionally, without relying on the unproven Aaronson-Ambainis conjecture, against low query-depth quantum adversaries: specifically, adversaries that make up to o(\log λ) adaptive quantum queries to the random oracle.
CommentsTo be published at FOCS 2026
