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arXiv 1102.5584cs.LOcs.CR
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一种用于安全协议推理的空间认知逻辑

A Spatial-Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Security Protocols

Bernardo Toninho, Luís Caires

摘要:

关于安全属性的推理涉及关于系统的信息位于何处以及它如何随时间演变的推理。虽然大多数安全分析技术需要处理信息局部性和知识传播的一些概念,但通常它们不提供用于表达涉及局部知识和知识转移的任意属性的通用语言。在此基础上,我们介绍了一个框架,基于动态空间逻辑规范的安全协议分析。我们的计算模型是现有的π演算的一个变种,而规格表示在一个动态的空间逻辑扩展的认知算子。我们提出的语法和语义的模型和逻辑,并讨论了表达的方法,显示它完成了被动攻击者。我们还证明了通用Dolev-Yao攻击者可以机械地确定任何确定性有限协议,并讨论了如何使用这个结果可能是开放系统的安全属性的原因。我们还提出了一个模型检查算法,我们的逻辑,这已被实现为SLMC系统的扩展。

英文摘要:

Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator. We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an extension to the SLMC system.

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