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arXiv 2009.07513cs.CRcs.GT
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完全安全的消息传输对抗Rational对手

Perfectly Secure Message Transmission against Rational Adversaries

Maiki Fujita, Takeshi Koshiba, Kenji Yasunaga

摘要:

安全消息传输(SMT)是一种双方加密协议,通过该协议,发送方可以使用多个通道安全可靠地将消息传输到接收方。攻击者可以破坏信道的子集,并在信道上进行窃听和篡改攻击。在这项工作中,我们引入了一个博弈论的安全模型SMT中,对手有一些偏好的协议执行。我们定义理性的“胆小”的对手谁喜欢违反安全要求,但不喜欢被检测到的篡改。首先,我们考虑一个单一的对手攻击协议的基本设置。我们构建完美的SMT协议,对任何理性的对手腐败,但其中一个渠道。由于少数腐败是需要在传统的设置,我们的研究结果表明,通过博弈论的方法规避加密不可能的结果。接下来,我们研究的设置中,所有的渠道可以被损坏的多个对手谁不合作。由于我们不能指望任何安全,如果一个单一的对手破坏所有的渠道或多个对手恶意合作,这种情况下,可以从博弈论模型。我们还研究了恶意和理性的对手都存在的情况。

英文摘要:

Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. An adversary can corrupt a subset of the channels and commit eavesdropping and tampering attacks over the channels. In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic security model for SMT in which adversaries have some preferences for protocol execution. We define rational "timid" adversaries who prefer to violate security requirements but do not prefer the tampering to be detected. First, we consider the basic setting where a single adversary attacks the protocol. We construct perfect SMT protocols against any rational adversary corrupting all but one of the channels. Since minority corruption is required in the traditional setting, our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the cryptographic impossibility results by a game-theoretic approach. Next, we study the setting in which all the channels can be corrupted by multiple adversaries who do not cooperate. Since we cannot hope for any security if a single adversary corrupts all the channels or multiple adversaries cooperate maliciously, the scenario can arise from a game-theoretic model. We also study the scenario in which both malicious and rational adversaries exist.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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