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arXiv 2610.29201cs.GT
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EFX的帕累托无效率

Pareto Inefficiency of EFX

Microsoft Research(微软研究院);Harvard University(哈佛大学)

Sepideh Mahabadi, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Jakub Tarnawski

AI总结:

该研究针对不可分商品分配问题,证明所有商品对智能体均有正价值时仍可能不存在帕累托最优EFX分配,且推广得α>2/3时帕累托最优α-EFX分配也可能不存在。

摘要:

我们研究在两种经典公平与效率概念——任意商品无嫉妒(EFX)和帕累托最优下,将不可分商品分配给具有加性估值的智能体的问题。早期关于EFX的研究表明,若智能体对部分商品价值为零,可能不存在帕累托最优的EFX分配;但所有价值均为正时是否存在该情况仍未解决。我们给出一个简单实例,其中每件商品对所有智能体均有正价值,但不存在帕累托最优的EFX分配。随后我们将其推广到一类实例,表明对任意α>2/3,可能不存在帕累托最优的α-EFX分配。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations, under two classic notions of fairness and efficiency: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and Pareto optimality. While some of the earliest work on EFX showed that Pareto optimal EFX allocations may not exist if agents can have zero value for some goods, it has remained open whether the same is true when all values are positive. We present a simple instance in which every good has positive value to every agent, but no Pareto optimal EFX allocation exists. We then generalize to a family of instances showing that Pareto optimal $α$-EFX allocations may not exist for any $α> 2/3$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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