我们研究了在具有加性估值的代理人之间公平且高效分配不可分割商品的问题。我们关注的是 envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) —— 在不可分割商品公平分配中的一个重要公平性概念。该领域的一个核心开放问题是EFX分配是否总是存在任何数量的代理人。尽管先前的工作已经建立了在至多三种不同估值情况下EFX存在的结果（Prakash HV等，2025）以及两种类型商品的情况（Gorantla, Marwaha和Velusamy，2023），但一般情况仍未解决。在本文中，我们通过证明当存在两种类型商品且估值为正时，满足帕累托最优（PO）的EFX分配总是存在且可以在准线性时间内计算，从而扩展了现有知识。该结果加强了现有工作（Gorantla, Marwaha和Velusamy，2023）的成果，后者仅保证了EFX分配的存在性而未确保帕累托最优性。我们的发现展示了一个简单且高效的算法，用于构建EFX+PO分配。
英文摘要：
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) -- an important fairness notion in fair division of indivisible goods. A central open question in this field is whether EFX allocations always exist for any number of agents. While prior work has established EFX existence for settings with at most three distinct valuations (Prakash HV et al. 2025) and for two types of goods (Gorantla, Marwaha, and Velusamy 2023), the general case remains unresolved.
In this paper, we extend the existent knowledge by proving that EFX allocations satisfying Pareto optimality (PO) always exist and can be computed in quasiliniear time when there are two types of goods, given that the valuations are positive. This result strengthens the existing work of (Gorantla, Marwaha, and Velusamy 2023), which only guarantees the existence of EFX allocations without ensuring Pareto optimality. Our findings demonstrate a fairly simple and efficient algorithm constructing an EFX+PO allocation.
The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental open problem in discrete fair division. Given a set of agents and indivisible goods, the goal is to determine the existence of an allocation where no agent envies another following the removal of any single good from the other agent's bundle. Since the general problem has been illusive, progress is made on two fronts: $(i)$ proving existence when the number of agents is small, $(ii)$ proving existence of relaxations of EFX. In this paper, we improve results on both fronts (and simplify in one of the cases). We prove the existence of EFX allocat…
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We establish that an MNW allocation is always EFX as long as there are at most two possible values for the goods, whereas this implication is no longer true for three or more distinct values. As a notable consequence, this proves the existence of EFX allocations for these restricted valuation functions. While the efficient computation of an MNW a…
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by many researchers for several years, the existence of EFX allocations has not been settled beyond the simple case of two agents. In this paper, we show constructively that an EFX allocation always exists for three agents. Furthermore, we falsify the conjecture by Caragiannis et al. by showing an instance with three agents for which there is a partial EFX all…
Non-Existence of EFX Chore Allocations for Monotone Cost Functions with Binary Marginals
University of Macau（澳门大学）；Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen（哈尔滨工业大学（深圳））；Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学）；Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)~the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for goods with copies; (2)~the existence of EFX and other solution concepts for chores. We establish a tight relation between these issues via two conceptual contributions: First, a refinement of envy-based fairness notions that we term envy \emph{without commons} (denoted $\efxwc$ when applied to EFX). Second, a formal \emph{duality theorem} relating the existence of a host of (refined) fair allocation concepts fo…
The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem in fair division, even for additive valuations. The current state of the art is that no setting where EFX allocations are impossible is known, and EFX is known to exist for ($i$) agents with identical valuations, ($ii$) 2 agents, ($iii$) 3 agents with additive valuations, ($iv$) agents with one of two additive valuations and ($v$) agents with two-valued instances. It is also known that EFX exists if one can leave $n-1$ items unallocated, where $n$ is the number of agents. We develop new techniques that allow us to push the boundaries of …
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX$_0$, EFX$^3$ and EF1$^3$ - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1$^3$ allocation. With $-α/0/α$ utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX$^3$ and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With $-α/0/β$ utilities, this algorithm a…
When allocating a set of indivisible items among agents, the ideal condition of envy-freeness cannot always be achieved. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and envy-freeness with $k$ hidden items (HEF-$k$) are two very compelling relaxations of envy-freeness, which remain elusive in many settings. We study a natural relaxation of these two fairness constraints, where we place the agents on the vertices of an undirected graph, and only require that our allocations satisfy the EFX (resp. HEF) constraint on the edges of the graph. We refer to these allocations as graph-EFX (resp. graph-HEF) or s…
EFX Allocations Exist on Triangle-Free Multi-Graphs
Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology（德黑兰理工大学计算机工程系）；Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus (SIC)（萨尔兰信息学园区马克斯·普朗克计算机科学研究所）
Envy-freeness is one of the most widely studied notions in fair division. Since envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible, several relaxations have been considered. Among them, possibly the most compelling concept is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). We study the existence of EFX allocations for general valuations. The existence of EFX allocations is a major open problem. For general valuations, it is known that an EFX allocation always exists (i) when $n=2$ or (ii) when all agents have identical valuations, where $n$ is the number of agents. it is also known that …
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of indivisible goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond the simple case of two agents with subadditive valuations, some good approximations of EFX are known to exist, namely $\tfrac{1}{2}$-EFX allocation and EFX allocations with bounded charity. Nash welfare (the geometric mean of agents' valuations) is one of the most commonly used measures of efficiency…
Czech Technical University in Prague（布拉格捷克理工大学）；University of West Attica（西阿提卡大学）；Athens University of Economics and Business（雅典经济与商业大学）；Archimedes/Athena RC（阿基米德/雅典研究中心）
A Counterexample to EFX $n \ge 3$ Agents, $m \ge n + 5$ Items, Submodular Valuations via SAT-Solving
Max Planck Institute for Informatics（马克斯·普朗克信息学研究所）；Saarland Informatics Campus（萨尔兰信息学校园）；University of Bonn（波恩大学）；Hertz Chair for Algorithms and Optimization（赫茨算法与优化讲席）；Saarbrücken Graduate School for Computer Science（萨尔布吕肯计算机科学研究生院）；CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security（CISPA赫尔霍兹信息安全中心）
Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations
Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business（阿提卡经济与商业大学信息学院）；Archimedes, Athena Research Center（阿提卡研究中心）；School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh（爱丁堡大学信息学院）
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ indivisible goods to a set of $n$ agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- which requires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of any single good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when the resource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFX notion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has some non-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods. We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requi…
Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the closest to envy-freeness. Unfortunately, EFX allocations are not known to exist except in a few special cases. We make significant progress in this direction. We show that for every instance with additive valuations, there is an EFX allocation of a subset of items with a Nash welfare that is at least half of the maximum possible Nash welfare for the original set of items. That is, after d…
We study the problem of dividing indivisible chores among agents whose costs (for the chores) are supermodular set functions with binary marginals. Such functions capture complementarity among chores, i.e., they constitute an expressive class wherein the marginal disutility of each chore is either one or zero, and the marginals increase with respect to supersets. In this setting, we study the broad landscape of finding fair and efficient chore allocations. In particular, we establish the existence of $(i)$ EF1 and Pareto efficient chore allocations, $(ii)$ MMS-fair and Pareto efficient allocat…
We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1+- and EFX+-. We compare these with the existing EF1 and EFX. Although EF1 and EF1+- allocations often exist, our results assert eloquently that EFX+- and PO allocations exist in each case where EFX and PO allocations do not exist. Additionally, we prove several new impossibility and incompatibility results.
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several general impossibility results and special possibility results for three common fairness concepts (i.e. EF1, EFX, EFX3) and one popular efficiency concept (i.e. PO). We also study how these interact with common welfare objectives such as the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares. For example, we show that maximizing the Nash welfare with mixed manna (or …
