We study the \emph{Submodular Welfare Problem} (SWP), where items are partitioned among agents with monotone submodular utilities to maximize the total welfare under \emph{bandit feedback}. Classical SWP assumes full value-oracle access, achieving $(1-1/e)$ approximations via continuous-greedy algorithms. We extend this to a \emph{multi-agent combinatorial bandit} framework (\textsc{MA-CMAB}), where actions are partitions under full-bandit feedback with non-communicating agents. Unlike prior single-agent or separable multi-agent CMAB models, our setting couples agents through shared allocation constraints. We propose an explore-then-commit strategy with randomized assignments, achieving $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ regret against a $(1-1/e)$ benchmark, the first such guarantee for partition-based submodular welfare problem under bandit feedback.
Indian Institute of Science（印度科学学院）；Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur（印度理工学院克勒格布尔分校）
We extend the notion of regret with a welfarist perspective. Focussing on the classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework, the current work quantifies the performance of bandit algorithms by applying a fundamental welfare function, namely the Nash social welfare (NSW) function. This corresponds to equating algorithm's performance to the geometric mean of its expected rewards and leads us to the study of Nash regret, defined as the difference between the -- a priori unknown -- optimal mean (among the arms) and the algorithm's performance. Since NSW is known to satisfy fairness axioms, our approa…
A recent line of research focuses on the study of the stochastic multi-armed bandits problem (MAB), in the case where temporal correlations of specific structure are imposed between the player's actions and the reward distributions of the arms (Kleinberg and Immorlica [FOCS18], Basu et al. [NeurIPS19]). As opposed to the standard MAB setting, where the optimal solution in hindsight can be trivially characterized, these correlations lead to (sub-)optimal solutions that exhibit interesting dynamical patterns -- a phenomenon that yields new challenges both from an algorithmic as well as a learnin…
KAUST（阿卜杜拉国王科技大学）；Purdue University（普渡大学）；Iowa State University（爱荷华州立大学）
We investigate the problem of unconstrained combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback and stochastic rewards for submodular maximization. Previous works investigate the same problem assuming a submodular and monotone reward function. In this work, we study a more general problem, i.e., when the reward function is not necessarily monotone, and the submodularity is assumed only in expectation. We propose Randomized Greedy Learning (RGL) algorithm and theoretically prove that it achieves a $\frac{1}{2}$-regret upper bound of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n T^{\frac{2}{3}})$ for horizon $…
Microsoft Research Silicon Valley（微软研究院硅谷分院）；Cornell University（康奈尔大学）；Facebook（脸书）
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer's goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that (approximately) maximizes the social welfare. If the advertisers bid their true private …
An overview of different variants of the submodular welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In particular, I studied the existing algorithmic and game theoretic results for submodular welfare maximization problem and its applications in other areas such as social networks.
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
Communication networks shared by many users are a widespread challenge nowadays. In this paper we address several aspects of this challenge simultaneously: learning unknown stochastic network characteristics, sharing resources with other users while keeping coordination overhead to a minimum. The proposed solution combines Multi-Armed Bandit learning with a lightweight signalling-based coordination scheme, and ensures convergence to a stable allocation of resources. Our work considers single-user level algorithms for two scenarios: an unknown fixed number of users, and a dynamic number of user…
We present a $380$-approximation algorithm for the Nash Social Welfare problem with submodular valuations. Our algorithm builds on and extends a recent constant-factor approximation for Rado valuations.
Recently a multi-agent variant of the classical multi-armed bandit was proposed to tackle fairness issues in online learning. Inspired by a long line of work in social choice and economics, the goal is to optimize the Nash social welfare instead of the total utility. Unfortunately previous algorithms either are not efficient or achieve sub-optimal regret in terms of the number of rounds $T$. We propose a new efficient algorithm with lower regret than even previous inefficient ones. For $N$ agents, $K$ arms, and $T$ rounds, our approach has a regret bound of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{NKT} + NK)$. This i…
We study the Nash Social Welfare problem: Given $n$ agents with valuation functions $v_i:2^{[m]} \rightarrow {\mathbb R}$, partition $[m]$ into $S_1,\ldots,S_n$ so as to maximize $(\prod_{i=1}^{n} v_i(S_i))^{1/n}$. The problem has been shown to admit a constant-factor approximation for additive, budget-additive, and piecewise linear concave separable valuations; the case of submodular valuations is open. We provide a $\frac{1}{e} (1-\frac{1}{e})^2$-approximation of the {\em optimal value} for several classes of submodular valuations: coverage, sums of matroid rank functions, and certain matchi…
We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the \emph{liquid welfare}, a notion of efficiency for budget-constrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014). We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that best-approximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymptotically the same approximation guarantees for the liqu…
We present a new type of monotone submodular functions: \emph{multi-peak submodular functions}. Roughly speaking, given a family of sets $\cF$, we construct a monotone submodular function $f$ with a high value $f(S)$ for every set $S \in {\cF}$ (a "peak"), and a low value on every set that does not intersect significantly any set in $\cF$. We use this construction to show that a better than $(1-\frac{1}{2e})$-approximation ($\simeq 0.816$) for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations is (1) impossible in the communication model, (2) NP-hard in the computational…
Columbia University（哥伦比亚大学）；Microsoft Research（微软研究院）；University of Minnesota - Twin Cities（明尼苏达大学双城分校）
We empirically study the interplay between exploration and competition. Systems that learn from interactions with users often engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal decisions in order to acquire new information for future decisions. However, when multiple systems are competing for the same market of users, exploration may hurt a system's reputation in the near term, with adverse competitive effects. In particular, a system may enter a "death spiral", when the short-term reputation cost decreases the number of users for the system to learn from, which degrades its performance rela…
We design a new myopic strategy for a wide class of sequential design of experiment (DOE) problems, where the goal is to collect data in order to to fulfil a certain problem specific goal. Our approach, Myopic Posterior Sampling (MPS), is inspired by the classical posterior (Thompson) sampling algorithm for multi-armed bandits and leverages the flexibility of probabilistic programming and approximate Bayesian inference to address a broad set of problems. Empirically, this general-purpose strategy is competitive with more specialised methods in a wide array of DOE tasks, and more importantly, e…
We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like) valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approximation algorithm with factor independent of m i…
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if the bidders valuation functions are submodular over their signals (a.k.a. SOS), a truthful 4-approximation to the optimal welfare exists. We show existence of a mechanism that is truthful and achieves a tight 2-approximation to the optimal welfare when signals are binary. Our mechanism is randomized and assigns bidders only 0 or 0.5 probabilities of winning the item. Our results utilize properties of submodul…
We propose a multi-agent variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem, in which there are $N$ agents and $K$ arms, and pulling an arm generates a (possibly different) stochastic reward for each agent. Unlike the classical multi-armed bandit problem, the goal is not to learn the "best arm"; indeed, each agent may perceive a different arm to be the best for her personally. Instead, we seek to learn a fair distribution over the arms. Drawing on a long line of research in economics and computer science, we use the Nash social welfare as our notion of fairness. We design multi-agent variants…
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare as our objective and design a polynomial-time algorithm that, in the value oracle model, finds an $8n$-approximation to the Nash optimal allocation. Subadditive valuations include XOS (fractionally subadditive) and submodular valuations as special cases. Our result, even for the special case of submodular valuations, improves upon the previously best known $O(n \log n)$-approximation ratio of…
Université Paris-Saclay（巴黎萨克雷大学）；ENS Paris-Saclay（巴黎萨克雷高等师范学院）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Centre Borelli（博雷利中心）；CREST（经济与统计研究中心）；ENSAE Paris（巴黎国立统计与经济管理学院）；Criteo AI Lab（Criteo人工智能实验室）
Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic multi-player multi-armed bandits gained a lot of interest recently. In this class of problems, several players simultaneously pull arms and encounter a collision - with 0 reward - if some of them pull the same arm at the same time. While the cooperative case where players maximize the collective reward (obediently following some fixed protocol) has been mostly considered, robustness to malicious players is a crucial and challenging concern. Existing approaches consider only the case of adversarial jammers whose objective is to blindly minimize the coll…
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -ε}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use exponentially many value queries, where $m$ is the number of items. In contrast, ignoring incentives there exist constant ratio approximation algorithms for this problem. Our approach is based on a novel \emph{direct hardness} approach and completely skips the notoriously hard characterization step. The characterization step was the main obstacle for proving impossibility resu…
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was obtained by Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [STOC'06] who gave an $O(\log^2{m})$-approximation where $m$ is the number of items. This problem has been studied extensively since, culminating in an $O(\sqrt{\log{m}})$-approximation mechanism by Dobzinski [STOC'16]. We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism with approximation ratio that improves up…
We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of $O(\log^2 m)$ [STOC'06], where $m$ is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to $O(\log m\log \log m)$ [Dobzinski, APPROX'07] and then to $O(\log m)$ [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP'12]. In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specifically, the mechanism provides an a…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the optimal one. We show that when the valuations of the bidders are submodular, in many interesting settings (e.g., constant number of bidders, budget additive bidders) computing an equilibrium with good welfare is essentially as easy as computing, completely ignoring incentives issues, an allocation with good welfare. On the other hand, for subadditive valuations…
