Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic multi-player multi-armed bandits gained a lot of interest recently. In this class of problems, several players simultaneously pull arms and encounter a collision - with 0 reward - if some of them pull the same arm at the same time. While the cooperative case where players maximize the collective reward (obediently following some fixed protocol) has been mostly considered, robustness to malicious players is a crucial and challenging concern. Existing approaches consider only the case of adversarial jammers whose objective is to blindly minimize the collective reward. We shall consider instead the more natural class of selfish players whose incentives are to maximize their individual rewards, potentially at the expense of the social welfare. We provide the first algorithm robust to selfish players (a.k.a. Nash equilibrium) with a logarithmic regret, when the arm performance is observed. When collisions are also observed, Grim Trigger type of strategies enable some implicit communication-based algorithms and we construct robust algorithms in two different settings: the homogeneous (with a regret comparable to the centralized optimal one) and heterogeneous cases (for an adapted and relevant notion of regret). We also provide impossibility results when only the reward is observed or when arm means vary arbitrarily among players.
Motivated by applications in cognitive radio networks, we consider the decentralized multi-player multi-armed bandit problem, without collision nor sensing information. We propose Randomized Selfish KL-UCB, an algorithm with very low computational complexity, inspired by the Selfish KL-UCB algorithm, which has been abandoned as it provably performs sub-optimally in some cases. We subject Randomized Selfish KL-UCB to extensive numerical experiments showing that it far outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms in almost all environments, sometimes by several orders of magnitude, and without the ad…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik, 1971) are unfortunately of limited value in the learning setting, given that preferences are inherently uncertain and destabilizing while they are being learned. To bridge this gap, we develop a framework and algorithms for learning stable market outcomes under uncertainty. Our primary setting is matching with transferable utilities, where the platform both matc…
CentraleSupélec（中央理工-高等电力学院）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Université de Lille（里尔大学）；Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）
Multi-player Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) have been extensively studied in the literature, motivated by applications to Cognitive Radio systems. Driven by such applications as well, we motivate the introduction of several levels of feedback for multi-player MAB algorithms. Most existing work assume that sensing information is available to the algorithm. Under this assumption, we improve the state-of-the-art lower bound for the regret of any decentralized algorithms and introduce two algorithms, RandTopM and MCTopM, that are shown to empirically outperform existing algorithms. Moreover, we provide…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different reward functions, thus the game is general-sum. The majority of existing results in this field focuses on either symmetric solution concepts (e.g. Nash equilibrium) or zero-sum games. It remains open how to learn the Stackelberg equilibrium -- an asymmetric analog of the Nash equilibrium -- in general-sum games efficiently from noisy samples. This paper ini…
This paper presents a novel federated linear contextual bandits model, where individual clients face different K-armed stochastic bandits with high-dimensional decision context and coupled through common global parameters. By leveraging the sparsity structure of the linear reward , a collaborative algorithm named \texttt{Fedego Lasso} is proposed to cope with the heterogeneity across clients without exchanging local decision context vectors or raw reward data. \texttt{Fedego Lasso} relies on a novel multi-client teamwork-selfish bandit policy design, and achieves near-optimal regrets for share…
Consider a decision-maker that can pick one out of $K$ actions to control an unknown system, for $T$ turns. The actions are interpreted as different configurations or policies. Holding the same action fixed, the system asymptotically converges to a unique equilibrium, as a function of this action. The dynamics of the system are unknown to the decision-maker, which can only observe a noisy reward at the end of every turn. The decision-maker wants to maximize its accumulated reward over the $T$ turns. Learning what equilibria are better results in higher rewards, but waiting for the system to co…
I study a game of strategic exploration with private payoffs and public actions in a Bayesian bandit setting. In particular, I look at cascade equilibria, in which agents switch over time from the risky action to the riskless action only when they become sufficiently pessimistic. I show that these equilibria exist under some conditions and establish their salient properties. Individual exploration in these equilibria can be more or less than the single-agent level depending on whether the agents start out with a common prior or not, but the most optimistic agent always underexplores. I also sh…
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology（以色列理工学院）
We consider the problem of multiple users targeting the arms of a single multi-armed stochastic bandit. The motivation for this problem comes from cognitive radio networks, where selfish users need to coexist without any side communication between them, implicit cooperation or common control. Even the number of users may be unknown and can vary as users join or leave the network. We propose an algorithm that combines an $ε$-greedy learning rule with a collision avoidance mechanism. We analyze its regret with respect to the system-wide optimum and show that sub-linear regret can be obtained in …
The sharing of scarce resources among multiple rational agents is one of the classical problems in economics. In exchange economies, which are used to model such situations, agents begin with an initial endowment of resources and exchange them in a way that is mutually beneficial until they reach a competitive equilibrium (CE). The allocations at a CE are Pareto efficient and fair. Consequently, they are used widely in designing mechanisms for fair division. However, computing CEs requires the knowledge of agent preferences which are unknown in several applications of interest. In this work, w…
Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution concept for multi-player general-sum IIEFGs. However, existing algorithms for finding an EFCE require full feedback from the game, and it remains open how to efficiently learn the EFCE in the more challenging bandit feedback setting where the game can only be learned by observations from repeated playing. This paper presents the first sample-efficient algorithm…
Pompeu Fabra University（庞培法布拉大学）；ICREA（加泰罗尼亚高等研究院）；Barcelona Graduate School of Economics（巴塞罗那经济学研究生院）；McGill University（麦吉尔大学）
We study multiplayer stochastic multi-armed bandit problems in which the players cannot communicate and if two or more players pull the same arm, a collision occurs and the involved players receive zero reward. We consider two feedback models: a model in which the players can observe whether a collision has occurred and a more difficult setup when no collision information is available. We give the first theoretical guarantees for the second model: an algorithm with a logarithmic regret, and an algorithm with a square-root regret type that does not depend on the gaps between the means. For the …
Due to the pervasive demand for mobile services, next generation wireless networks are expected to be able to deliver high date rates while wireless resources become more and more scarce. This requires the next generation wireless networks to move towards new networking paradigms that are able to efficiently support resource-demanding applications such as personalized mobile services. Examples of such paradigms foreseen for the emerging fifth generation (5G) cellular networks include very densely deployed small cells and device-to-device communications. For 5G networks, it will be imperative t…
Competition between traditional platforms is known to improve user utility by aligning the platform's actions with user preferences. But to what extent is alignment exhibited in data-driven marketplaces? To study this question from a theoretical perspective, we introduce a duopoly market where platform actions are bandit algorithms and the two platforms compete for user participation. A salient feature of this market is that the quality of recommendations depends on both the bandit algorithm and the amount of data provided by interactions from users. This interdependency between the algorithm …
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum game is core to many problems in statistics, optimization, and economics, and for a fixed game matrix this can be easily reduced to solving a linear program. But when the payoff matrix evolves over time our goal is to find a sequential algorithm that can compete with, in a certain sense, the NE of the long-term-averaged payoff matrix. We design an algorithm …
Institute of Information Management, National Chiao Tung University（台湾交通大学信息管理研究所）；Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica（中央研究院信息科学研究所）
Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on "no-regret" algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics based on generic no-regret algorithms may not converge to Nash equilibria in general, but to a larger set of outcomes, namely coarse correlated equilibria. Moreover, convergence results based on generic no-regret algorithms typically use a weaker notion of convergence: the convergence of the average plays instead of the actual plays. Some work has been done s…
Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；University of California, Santa Barbara（加利福尼亚大学圣巴巴拉分校）
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equili…
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)（洛桑联邦理工学院）
An individual's decisions are often guided by those of his or her peers, i.e., neighbors in a social network. Presumably, being privy to the experiences of others aids in learning and decision making, but how much advantage does an individual gain by observing her neighbors? Such problems make appearances in sociology and economics and, in this paper, we present a novel model to capture such decision-making processes and appeal to the classical multi-armed bandit framework to analyze it. Each individual, in addition to her own actions, can observe the actions and rewards obtained by her neighb…
Stanford University（斯坦福大学）；New York University（纽约大学）
Consider a scenario where a player chooses an action in each round $t$ out of $T$ rounds and observes the incurred cost after a delay of $d_{t}$ rounds. The cost functions and the delay sequence are chosen by an adversary. We show that in a non-cooperative game, the expected weighted ergodic distribution of play converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria if players use algorithms that have "no weighted-regret" in the above scenario, even if they have linear regret due to too large delays. For a two-player zero-sum game, we show that no weighted-regret is sufficient for the weighted e…
We propose and investigate a class of new algorithms for sequential decision making that interacts with \textit{a batch of users} simultaneously instead of \textit{a user} at each decision epoch. This type of batch models is motivated by interactive marketing and clinical trial, where a group of people are treated simultaneously and the outcomes of the whole group are collected before the next stage of decision. In such a scenario, our goal is to allocate a batch of treatments to maximize treatment efficacy based on observed high-dimensional user covariates. We deliver a solution, named \texti…
A conceptually appealing approach for learning Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) is to convert them to Normal-Form Games (NFGs). This approach enables us to directly translate state-of-the-art techniques and analyses in NFGs to learning EFGs, but typically suffers from computational intractability due to the exponential blow-up of the game size introduced by the conversion. In this paper, we address this problem in natural and important setups for the \emph{$Φ$-Hedge} algorithm -- A generic algorithm capable of learning a large class of equilibria for NFGs. We show that $Φ$-Hedge can be directly use…
We investigate the use of a multi-agent multi-armed bandit (MA-MAB) setting for modeling repeated Cournot oligopoly games, where the firms acting as agents choose from the set of arms representing production quantity (a discrete value). Agents interact with separate and independent bandit problems. In this formulation, each agent makes sequential choices among arms to maximize its own reward. Agents do not have any information about the environment; they can only see their own rewards after taking an action. However, the market demand is a stationary function of total industry output, and rand…
National Technical University of Athens（雅典国立技术大学）；Columbia University（哥伦比亚大学）；Univ. Grenoble Alpes（格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学）；CNRS（法国国家科学研究中心）；Inria（法国国家信息与自动化研究所）；Criteo AI Lab（Criteo人工智能实验室）
In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider the full spectrum of uncertainty that the players may encounter - from noisy, oracle-based feedback, to bandit, payoff-based information. In this general context, we establish a comprehensive equivalence between the stability of a Nash equilibrium and its support: a Nash equilibrium is stable and attracting with arbitrarily high probability if and only if it …
Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research（人工智能研究中心）；University of Agder（阿格德大学）
Although simple individually, artificial neurons provide state-of-the-art performance when interconnected in deep networks. Arguably, the Tsetlin Automaton is an even simpler and more versatile learning mechanism, capable of solving the multi-armed bandit problem. Merely by means of a single integer as memory, it learns the optimal action in stochastic environments through increment and decrement operations. In this paper, we introduce the Tsetlin Machine, which solves complex pattern recognition problems with propositional formulas, composed by a collective of Tsetlin Automata. To eliminate t…
Many past attempts at modeling repeated Cournot games assume that demand is stationary. This does not align with real-world scenarios in which market demands can evolve over a product's lifetime for a myriad of reasons. In this paper, we model repeated Cournot games with non-stationary demand such that firms/agents face separate instances of non-stationary multi-armed bandit problem. The set of arms/actions that an agent can choose from represents discrete production quantities; here, the action space is ordered. Agents are independent and autonomous, and cannot observe anything from the envir…
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign（伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校）；University of California, Los Angeles（加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校）；DeepMind（深度思维）；Massachusetts Institute of Technology（麻省理工学院）
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms often suffer from an exponential sample complexity dependence on the number of agents, a phenomenon known as \emph{the curse of multiagents}. In this paper, we address this challenge by investigating sample-efficient model-free algorithms in \emph{decentralized} MARL, and aim to improve existing algorithms along this line. For learning (coarse) correlated equilibria in general-sum Markov games, we propose \emph{stage-based} V-learning algorithms that significantly simplify the algorithmic design and analysis of recent works, and circumvent a…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has shown recent success in increasingly complex fixed-team zero-sum environments. However, the real world is not zero-sum nor does it have fixed teams; humans face numerous social dilemmas and must learn when to cooperate and when to compete. To successfully deploy agents into the human world, it may be important that they be able to understand and help in our conflicts. Unfortunately, selfish MARL agents typically fail when faced with social dilemmas. In this work, we show evidence of emergent direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and reputation, …
A natural goal in multiagent learning besides finding equilibria is to learn rationalizable behavior, where players learn to avoid iteratively dominated actions. However, even in the basic setting of multiplayer general-sum games, existing algorithms require a number of samples exponential in the number of players to learn rationalizable equilibria under bandit feedback. This paper develops the first line of efficient algorithms for learning rationalizable Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE) and Correlated Equilibria (CE) whose sample complexities are polynomial in all problem parameters includ…
