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arXiv 2408.05050physics.soc-ph
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混合交互下的社会传染

Social contagion under hybrid interactions

Xincheng Shu, Man Yang, Zhongyuan Ruan, Qi Xuan

AI总结:

本文提出一种同时融合阈值机制与博弈论理性模仿行为的混合交互模型,研究社会传染动力学,发现采纳收益的正负决定传播结果,且节点理性程度可调节传播速度。

摘要:

阈值驱动模型和博弈论是描述社会系统中人类互动的两种基本范式。然而,在模拟社会传染过程时,同时纳入这两种机制的模型在很大程度上被忽视了。本文研究了一个整合混合交互形式的通用模型,假设网络中一部分节点由阈值机制驱动,而其余节点表现出受其理性支配的模仿行为(在博弈论框架下)。我们的结果表明,传播动力学由采纳的收益决定。对于正收益,增加高理性节点的密度可以促进采纳过程,并伴随双重相变。理性程度可以调节传播速度,理性较低的模仿者会减缓传播。我们进一步发现,对于负的采纳收益,结果相反。该模型可能为理解现实世界社会网络中社会传染现象的复杂动力学提供有价值的见解。

英文摘要:

Threshold-driven models and game theory are two fundamental paradigms for describing human interactions in social systems. However, in mimicking social contagion processes, models that simultaneously incorporate these two mechanisms have been largely overlooked. Here, we study a general model that integrates hybrid interaction forms by assuming that a part of nodes in a network are driven by the threshold mechanism, while the remaining nodes exhibit imitation behavior governed by their rationality (under the game-theoretic framework). Our results reveal that the spreading dynamics are determined by the payoff of adoption. For positive payoffs, increasing the density of highly rational nodes can promote the adoption process, accompanied by a double phase transition. The degree of rationality can regulate the spreading speed, with less rational imitators slowing down the spread. We further find that the results are opposite for negative payoffs of adoption. This model may provide valuable insights into understanding the complex dynamics of social contagion phenomena in real-world social networks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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