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arXiv 2406.07186econ.TH
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具有成本的信息聚合

Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition

Durham University(杜伦大学)

Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev

AI总结:

本文研究了动态交易模型中部分信息投资者的信息聚合问题,提出通过允许交易者以成本κ获取信号,定义κ可分离证券,证明其在信息聚合中的作用,并揭示成本降低对证券信息聚合能力的影响。

摘要:

我们研究了一个动态交易模型中部分信息投资者的信息聚合问题。Ostrovsky [2012] 显示,在所有均衡中,'可分离'证券能够聚合信息,但确定一个证券是否可分离需要知道代理的精确信息结构。为了解决这个问题,我们允许交易者在每个时期以成本κ获取信号。我们证明,`κ可分离证券'决定了信息聚合,并且当成本降低时,几乎所有证券都成为κ可分离,无论交易者的初始私人信息如何。此外,向κ可分离性转变并非逐渐发生,而是突然发生的,因此即使成本略微降低,证券也可能聚合信息。我们提供了证券在信息聚合能力方面的完整分类,这令人惊讶地仅取决于其收益结构。

英文摘要:

We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed traders. Ostrovsky [2012] showed that `separable' securities aggregate information in all equilibria, however, determining whether a security is separable requires knowing the exact information structure of agents. To remedy this problem, we allow traders to acquire signals with cost $κ$, in every period. We show that `$κ$ separable securities' characterize information aggregation and, as the cost decreases, almost all securities become $κ$ separable, irrespective of the traders' initial private information. Moreover, the switch to $κ$ separability happens not gradually but discontinuously, hence even a small decrease in costs can result in a security aggregating information. We provide a complete classification of securities in terms of how well they aggregate information, which surprisingly depends only on their payoff structure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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