arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2402.17874cs.GT
收藏

连续博弈中的混合策略约束

Mixed Strategy Constraints in Continuous Games

Mel Krusniak, Forrest Laine

AI总结:

本文研究连续博弈中尊重混合策略的耦合约束设置问题,提出基于概率的机会约束方法并给出数值求解方案,在追逃博弈中验证了其保真度、参数敏感性与效率。

摘要:

在将机器人交互建模为Nash均衡问题时,期望设置耦合约束以限制这些交互安全且可接受(例如避免碰撞)。此类博弈是连续的且可能存在混合策略均衡,这种特性组合意味着在设置耦合约束时必须特别小心,既要尊重混合策略又要与连续博弈求解方法兼容。本文研究此背景下的约束设置问题,主要关注基于概率的方法。我们首先在离散环境中论证这些机会约束,将其应用于n人矩阵博弈,作为处理混合的概率特性的合理方法。然后,我们描述一种针对这些机会约束连续博弈的数值求解方法,并进行同步纯策略优化。最后,使用改进的追逃博弈作为示例,展示该求解方法在保真度、参数敏感性和效率方面的实际行为。

英文摘要:

When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with potential mixed strategy equilibria, and this combination of characteristics means special care must be given to setting coupled constraints in a way that respects mixed strategies while remaining compatible with continuous game solution methods. Here, we investigate the problem of constraint-setting in this context, primarily focusing on a chance-based method. We first motivate these chance constraints in a discrete setting, placing them on n-player matrix games as a justifiable approach to handling the probabilistic nature of mixing. Then, we describe a numerical solution method for these chance constrained, continuous games with simultaneous pure strategy optimization. Finally, using a modified pursuit-evasion game as a motivating example, we demonstrate the actual behavior of this solution method in terms of its fidelity, parameter sensitivity, and efficiency

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑