arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2402.16547cs.GT
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智能体设计的合约:如何出售隐藏行动

Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli

AI总结:

本文研究服务提供商向用户出售服务时的隐藏行动问题,提出通过经济激励建立信任的合约设计模型,并致力于计算能够保证用户信任服务提供商的合约。

摘要:

我们研究服务提供商向用户出售服务所面临的问题。在我们的模型中,服务提供商向用户提出各种支付选项(菜单),这些选项可以基于例如服务质量。然后,用户选择其中一个选项,并根据观察到的最终结果向服务提供商支付一定金额。用户无法直接观察服务提供商为达成最终结果所执行的行为。这可能激励不当行为。因此,我们提出一个通过经济激励来强制建立信任的模型。该问题有两个关键特征:i) 服务提供商既负责制定合约,又负责执行用户为其付费的行为;ii) 用户不知道服务提供商实际执行的真实行为,该行为是隐藏的。我们通过合约设计的视角研究这一委托问题,总体目标是实现合约的计算,从而保证即使用户的行为是隐藏的,用户也能信任服务提供商。

英文摘要:

We study the problem faced by a service provider that has to sell services to a user. In our model the service provider proposes various payment options (a menu) to the user which may be based, for example, on the quality of the service. Then, the user chooses one of these options and pays an amount to the service provider, contingent on the observed final outcome. Users are not able to observe directly the action performed by the service provide to reach the final outcome. This might incentivize misconduct. Therefore, we propose a model that enforces trust through economics incentives. The problem has two crucial features: i) the service provider is responsible for both formulating the contract and performing the action for which the user issues payments, and ii) the user is unaware of the true action carried out by the service provider, which is hidden. We study this delegation problem through the lens of contract design, with the overarching goal of enabling the computation of contracts that guarantee that the user can trust the service provider, even if their action is hidden.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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