通过评分规则获取信息的合同
Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules
摘要:
我们考虑一个委托代理问题,代理人可以私下选择获取相关信息之前,采取隐藏的行动。该模型概括了两种特殊情况:一个经典的道德风险设置,以及最近研究的激励信息获取(IA)的问题。我们表明,所有这些问题都可以减少到一个适当的评分规则的设计。在有限责任条件下,我们先考虑特殊情况,然后再考虑一般问题。对于IA的特殊情况,我们给出了新的结果,给出了一般多维问题的封闭形式的“尖多面体锥”解。我们还描述了一个几何,评分规则为基础的解决方案的情况下,经典的合同问题。最后,我们对一般的信息获取合同问题给出了一个有效的算法。
英文摘要:
We consider a principal-agent problem where the agent may privately choose to acquire relevant information prior to taking a hidden action. This model generalizes two special cases: a classic moral hazard setting, and a more recently studied problem of incentivizing information acquisition (IA). We show that all of these problems can be reduced to the design of a proper scoring rule. Under a limited liability condition, we consider the special cases separately and then the general problem. We give novel results for the special case of IA, giving a closed form "pointed polyhedral cone" solution for the general multidimensional problem. We also describe a geometric, scoring-rules based solution to the case of the classic contracts problem. Finally, we give an efficient algorithm for the general problem of Contracts with Information Acquisition.
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