在线信息获取:雇佣多个智能体
Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents
AI总结:
本文研究多智能体 costly information 获取的机制设计,提出多项式时间最优激励相容机制,并在未知智能体在线交互中给出达到 \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3}) 遗憾的无悔算法。
摘要:
我们研究了一个委托人所面临的机制设计问题:该委托人雇佣多个智能体来收集并报告需要付出成本的信息。随后,委托人利用这些信息作出明智决策。我们将该问题建模为一个博弈,其中委托人公布一种由行动建议和支付函数(也称为评分规则)组成的机制。接着,每个智能体选择一个努力水平,并根据该努力获得关于潜在自然状态的部分信息。最后,智能体报告信息(可能不真实),委托人基于这些信息作出决策,并根据评分规则向智能体支付报酬。以往工作关注单智能体问题,而我们考虑多智能体场景。这带来了协调智能体努力并聚合相关信息的挑战。事实上,我们证明最优机制必须使智能体的努力相互关联,这会在智能体之间引入外部性,从而产生复杂的激励相容约束和均衡选择问题。首先,我们设计了一种多项式时间算法来寻找最优的激励相容机制。随后,我们研究一个在线问题,其中委托人反复与一组未知智能体互动。我们设计了一种无悔算法,相对于最优机制可提供 \widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3}) 的遗憾,与单智能体场景下的最先进界相匹配。
英文摘要:
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。