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arXiv 1907.04252cs.GT
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秘书推荐问题

The Secretary Recommendation Problem

Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky

摘要:

在本文中,我们重温经典秘书问题的基本变种。我们提出了一种新的方法,在这种方法中,我们将评估秘书绩效的代理人与必须做出招聘决定的代理人分开。评估代理(发送者)将候选人的质量信号发送给招聘代理(接收者),后者必须做出决定。当两个代理的利益不完全一致时,这会导致发送方的信息传输(信令)挑战。我们研究了发送者的优化问题的几个变种的问题的接收器的说服力约束。我们的研究结果量化的性能损失的发件人由于在线到达。我们提供了最佳和接近最佳的说服机制,恢复至少一个恒定的分数的发送者的自然效用基准。评估和决策的分离会对近似结果产生重大影响。虽然在某些场景中,技术和结果密切反映了标准秘书问题的条件,但我们也探索了导致非常不同特征的条件。

英文摘要:

In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The evaluating agent (the sender) signals the quality of the candidate to the hiring agent (the receiver) who must make a decision. Whenever the two agents' interests are not fully aligned, this induces an information transmission (signaling) challenge for the sender. We study the sender's optimization problem subject to persuasiveness constraints of the receiver for several variants of the problem. Our results quantify the loss in performance for the sender due to online arrival. We provide optimal and near-optimal persuasive mechanisms that recover at least a constant fraction of a natural utility benchmark for the sender. The separation of evaluation and decision making can have a substantial impact on the approximation results. While in some scenarios, techniques and results closely mirror the conditions in the standard secretary problem, we also explore conditions that lead to very different characteristics.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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