发表机构
Maastricht University（马斯特里赫特大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究客户隐藏时间灵活性时的成本分摊问题，发现防止联盟性缩减的核心选择规则存在性取决于人口规模与可验证日期条件，并给出精确边界。
AI 中文摘要
客户通常指定接受服务的可接受时间区间。当在某个日期提供服务需要固定的启动成本时，重叠的区间允许联合服务和成本分摊。然而，客户可能通过报告更小的区间来隐藏灵活性，这会影响运营成本及其分配。我们探讨的问题是：运营商是否可以在每个报告的配置下选择核心分配，同时使隐藏行为无利可图。我们建立了防止此类联盟性缩减的严格人口边界。当区间可以从任一端缩短时，存在一个防止此类缩减的核心选择规则，当且仅当客户数量至多为三。当客户数量为四或更多时，即使在帕累托收缩可证明性下，不可能性依然成立，该性质排除了使每个收缩客户至少不差且至少一个严格更好的偏离。当每个收缩客户仅隐藏其可行区间的任意小部分时，不可能性依然存在。当每个客户的最早或最晚可接受日期可验证时，边界发生变化。在共同验证日期下，均等分摊是核心选择的，并且对任何人口规模都能防止此类缩减。当验证日期可能不同时，边界升至五：对于至多五个客户存在这样的规则，而对于六个或更多客户，没有核心选择规则能防止收缩客户减少其合并支付。然而，在帕累托收缩可证明性下，核心选择在任一单侧域上对任何人口规模都是可能的。最后，近似核心选择和联盟性收缩可证明性所需的放宽条件必须随人口规模增长。
英文摘要
Customers often specify acceptable time intervals for receiving a service. When service on a date entails a fixed activation cost, overlapping intervals allow joint service and cost sharing. Customers may nevertheless conceal flexibility by reporting a smaller interval, affecting both operating cost and its allocation. We ask whether an operator can select a core allocation at every reported profile without making concealment profitable. We establish sharp population boundaries for preventing such coalitional reductions. When intervals may be narrowed from either end, a core-selecting rule preventing such reductions exists if and only if there are at most three customers. With four or more customers, impossibility holds even under Pareto contraction-proofness, which excludes deviations making every contracting customer weakly better off and at least one strictly better off. The impossibility persists when each contracting customer conceals only an arbitrarily small fraction of her feasible interval. The boundaries change when either the earliest or latest acceptable date of every customer is verifiable. With common verified dates, equal sharing is core-selecting and prevents such reductions for any population size. When verified dates may differ, the boundary rises to five: such a rule exists for up to five customers, whereas with six or more no core-selecting rule prevents the contracting customers from reducing their combined payment. Under Pareto contraction-proofness, however, core selection is possible for every population size on either one-sided domain. Finally, the relaxations needed for approximate core selection and coalitional contraction-proofness must grow with population size.
