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arXiv 2305.04434cs.NI
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论互联网上的回弹流量

On Blowback Traffic on the Internet

Dallan Goldblatt, Calvin Vuong, Michael Rabinovich

AI总结:

本文研究单次探测引发大量响应数据包的回弹现象,发现数万至数十万主机产生回弹,平均放大达数量级,且回弹源稳定,可被利用发动放大式拒绝服务攻击。

摘要:

本文研究了一种现象:对目标进行单次探测会生成多个、有时甚至是大量的响应数据包,我们将其称为“回弹”(blowback)。理解回弹现象很重要,因为攻击者可以利用它,通过将回弹流量重定向至受害者,发起放大式拒绝服务攻击。回弹现象对互联网研究人员也有严重影响,因为他们的实验设置必须应对回弹流量的突发冲击。我们发现,数万个主机(在某些协议中,数十万个主机)会产生回弹流量,平均放大倍数达数个数量级。事实上,一些高产的“回弹生成器”在单次探测后会生成数百万个响应数据包。我们还发现,回弹生成器在数周内保持相对稳定,因此一旦被识别,攻击者便可在较长时间内利用这些主机。

英文摘要:

This paper considers the phenomenon where a single probe to a target generates multiple, sometimes numerous, packets in response -- which we term "blowback". Understanding blowback is important because attackers can leverage it to launch amplified denial of service attacks by redirecting blowback towards a victim. Blowback also has serious implications for Internet researchers since their experimental setups must cope with bursts of blowback traffic. We find that tens of thousands, and in some protocols, hundreds of thousands, of hosts generate blowback, with orders of magnitude amplification on average. In fact, some prolific blowback generators produce millions of response packets in the aftermath of a single probe. We also find that blowback generators are fairly stable over periods of weeks, so once identified, many of these hosts can be exploited by attackers for a long time.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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