人类合作中的进化分支和一致性：在解决集体action困境中激励和志愿服务的相互作用
Evolutionary branching and consistency in human cooperation: the interplay of incentives and volunteerism in addressing collective action dilemmas
摘要：
了解志愿服务和搭便车的起源在集体行动的情况下至关重要，在这种情况下，需要足够数量的合作者来实现共同利益，例如在疫苗接种运动和社会变革运动中。尽管获得成功的集体行动的行为一致性的重要性，这一过程背后的理论机制仍然在很大程度上难以捉摸。在这里，我们解决这个问题，通过研究多轮阈值公共产品游戏中的个人合作水平的演化动力学。通过使用自适应动力学，我们探讨了个体行为反应是如何被激励塑造的，有奖励或惩罚。我们证明，奖励一致的合作者可以导致两个不同的人群的出现：志愿者谁一贯合作和搭便车谁一贯的缺陷。相反，惩罚一贯的背叛者不会导致类似的进化分支。我们的研究结果有助于设计有效的干预措施，促进集体行动，解决从气候缓解到流行病控制等集体风险困境。
英文摘要：
Understanding the origins of volunteerism and free-riding is crucial in collective action situations where a sufficient number of cooperators is necessary to achieve shared benefits, such as in vaccination campaigns and social change movements. Despite the importance of attaining behavior consistency for successful collective action, the theoretical mechanisms behind this process remain largely elusive. Here, we address this issue by studying the evolutionary dynamics of individual cooperativity levels in multi-round threshold public goods games. By using adaptive dynamics, we explore how individual behavior responses are shaped by incentives, with and without rewards or punishment. We demonstrate that rewarding consistent cooperators can lead to the emergence of two distinct populations: volunteers who consistently cooperate and free-riders who consistently defect. In contrast, punishing consistent defectors does not lead to similar evolutionary branching. Our results help offer insights into designing effective interventions that promote collective action and address collective risk dilemmas ranging from climate mitigation to pandemic control.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
