Discrete-Modulated (DM) Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD) protocols are promising candidates for commercial implementations of quantum communication networks due to their experimental simplicity. While tight security analyses in the asymptotic limit exist, proofs in the finite-size regime are still subject to active research. We present a composable finite-size security proof against independently and identically distributed collective attacks for a general DM CV-QKD protocol. We introduce a new energy testing theorem to bound the effective dimension of Bob's system and rigorously prove security within Renner's epsilon-security framework and address the issue of acceptance sets in protocols and their security proof. We want to highlight, that our method also allows for nonunique acceptance statistics, which is necessary in practise. Finally, we extend and apply a numerical security proof technique to calculate tight lower bounds on the secure key rate. To demonstrate our method, we apply it to a quadrature phase-shift keying protocol, both for untrusted, ideal and trusted nonideal detectors. The results show that our security proof method yields secure finite-size key rates under experimentally viable conditions up to at least 72km transmission distance.
Security of Binary-Modulated Optical Key Distribution Against Quantum-Enhanced Coherent Eavesdropping
Centre for Quantum Optical Technologies, Centre of New Technologies, University of Warsaw（华沙大学新技术中心量子光学技术研究中心）；Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw（华沙大学物理学院）；Dipartimento di Fisica “Aldo Pontremoli”, Università degli Studi di Milano（米兰大学阿尔多·庞特罗莫利物理系）；Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Sezione di Milano（意大利国家核物理研究所米兰分部）
Unconditional Security of Discrete-Modulated CV-QKD from Infinite-Dimensional MEAT
University of Waterloo（滑铁卢大学）；National University of Singapore（新加坡国立大学）；Technische Universität Wien（维也纳工业大学）；AIT Austrian Institute of Technology（奥地利技术研究院）
Security bounds for unidimensional discrete-modulated CV-QKD: a Gaussian extremality approach
QuIIN - Quantum Industrial Innovation, EMBRAPII CIMATEC Competence Center in Quantum Technologies, SENAI CIMATEC（QuIIN - 量子工业创新，EMBRAPII CIMATEC 量子技术能力中心，SENAI CIMATEC）；Instituto de Fı́sica, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro（物理研究所，里约热内卢联邦大学）；Department of Electrical and Photonics Engineering, Technical University of Denmark（电气与光子工程系，丹麦技术大学）
Effective discrete-modulated continuous variable QKD under general attacks using dimension reduction
Luxquanta Technologies S.L.（Luxquanta科技有限公司）；ICFO - Institut de Ciencies Fotoniques, The Barcelona Institute of Science and Technology（ICFO-光子科学研究所，巴塞罗那科学技术研究院）；Universidad de Valladolid（巴利亚多利德大学）；ICREA – Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats（加泰罗尼亚高级研究学院）
Security-proof framework for two-way Gaussian quantum-key-distribution protocols
双向高斯协议具有将量子密钥分发（QKD）协议的密钥速率提高几个数量级的潜力。修订版~ A { \bf 94}，012322（2016）]。然而，双向协议的安全性证明目前还不发达。在本文中，我们建立了一个安全性证明框架的一般一致攻击双向高斯协议的渐近制度。我们首先证明了所有双向QKD协议的一致攻击安全性都可以归结为集体攻击安全性。接下来，我们确定了两个不同的约束，每个提供入侵参数，绑定窃听者的相干攻击信息增益的任何双向高斯QKD协议。最后，我们将我们的结果应用到两个这样的协议。
Realization of Backward Retrieval in a Stark-modulated Spin-wave Quantum Memory
Southern University of Science and Technology（南方科技大学）；International Quantum Academy, and Shenzhen Branch, Hefei National Laboratory（国际量子学院合肥国家实验室深圳分院）；CAS Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学院量子信息重点实验室中国科学技术大学）；Anhui Province Key Laboratory of Quantum Network, University of Science and Technology of China（安徽省量子网络重点实验室中国科学技术大学）；CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学院量子信息与量子物理前沿卓越创新中心中国科学技术大学）；Hefei National Laboratory, University of Science and Technology of China（合肥国家实验室中国科学技术大学）
Comment on 'Improving the security of protocols of quantum key agreement solely using Bell states and Bell measurement'
设计一个量子密钥协商（QKA）协议一直是一个具有挑战性的任务，因为它必须同时考虑安全性和公平性。最近，Zhu等人（Quantum Inf Process 14（11）：4245-4254）指出，Shukla等人的QKA协议（Quantum Inf Process 13（11）：2391-2405）存在一些安全缺陷（导致参与者攻击）。此外，他们还提出了一项改进措施，以避免这些缺点。然而，该研究指出，改进的协议也遭受共谋攻击，即，协议中的两个不诚实的参与者可以合作来操纵最终密钥而不被发现。
