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arXiv 2212.14367econ.TH
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双边贸易中的最优鲁棒机制

Optimal Robust Mechanism in Bilateral Trading

Komal Malik

摘要:

我们考虑一个具有私人价值的双边贸易模型。买方的价值和卖方的成本是共同分配的。真实的联合分布是未知的设计者,但是,边际分布的价值和成本是已知的设计者。设计者希望找到一种交易机制,它是稳健的贝叶斯激励相容的,稳健的个体理性的,不平衡的,并最大化所有这些机制的预期收益。我们将这种机制称为最优鲁棒机制。建立了贝叶斯激励相容机制(BIC)与占优策略机制(DSIC)的等价性。我们为一个给定的机制,最坏的分布,并使用此特性,以找到一个最佳的鲁棒机制。我们证明了存在一个最优的鲁棒机制,它是确定性的(发布价格),占优策略激励相容的,并且是事后个体理性的。我们还得到了这样一个最优的鲁棒机制的标价的显式表达式。我们还证明了最优鲁棒机制(最大-最小问题)的效率增益与保证效率增益之间的等价性,如果设计者可以在观察到真正的联合分布(最小-最大问题)后选择该机制。

英文摘要:

We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value and the cost are known to the designer. The designer wants to find a trading mechanism that is robustly Bayesian incentive compatible, robustly individually rational, budget-balanced and maximizes the expected gains from trade over all such mechanisms. We refer to such a mechanism as an optimal robust mechanism. We establish equivalence between Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (BIC) and dominant strategy mechanisms (DSIC). We characterise the worst distribution for a given mechanism and use this characterisation to find an optimal robust mechanism. We show that there is an optimal robust mechanism that is deterministic (posted-price), dominant strategy incentive compatible, and ex-post individually rational. We also derive an explicit expression of the posted-price of such an optimal robust mechanism. We also show the equivalence between the efficiency gains from the optimal robust mechanism (max-min problem) and guaranteed efficiency gains if the designer could choose the mechanism after observing the true joint distribution (min-max problem).

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