arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2210.04091eess.SYcs.SY
收藏

网络攻击下不确定网络控制系统传感器优化配置的零和博弈框架

A Zero-Sum Game Framework for Optimal Sensor Placement in Uncertain Networked Control Systems under Cyber-Attacks

Anh Tung Nguyen, Sribalaji C. Anand, André M. H. Teixeira

摘要:

针对不确定网络控制系统中的传感器最优配置问题,提出了一种博弈论方法。该问题被制定为一个零和游戏的两个球员,即一个恶意的对手和检测器。给定一个受保护的性能顶点,我们考虑一个检测器,与不确定的系统知识,选择另一个顶点上放置一个传感器和监测其输出的目的是检测对手的存在。另一方面,对手也具有不确定的系统知识,选择单个顶点并对其输入进行网络攻击。对手的目的是驱动攻击顶点,以最大限度地破坏受保护的性能顶点,同时保持未被检测器检测到。作为我们的第一个贡献,上述定义的零和游戏的游戏收益制定在对手的影响的风险价值。然而,这个游戏的回报对应于一个棘手的优化问题。为了解决这个问题,我们采用情景分析的方法来近似计算博弈的收益。然后,通过对零和博弈均衡的分析,确定了最优的监控者选择。通过一个10顶点网络控制系统的数值例子说明了所提出的方法。

英文摘要:

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious adversary and a detector. Given a protected performance vertex, we consider a detector, with uncertain system knowledge, that selects another vertex on which to place a sensor and monitors its output with the aim of detecting the presence of the adversary. On the other hand, the adversary, also with uncertain system knowledge, chooses a single vertex and conducts a cyber-attack on its input. The purpose of the adversary is to drive the attack vertex as to maximally disrupt the protected performance vertex while remaining undetected by the detector. As our first contribution, the game payoff of the above-defined zero-sum game is formulated in terms of the Value-at-Risk of the adversary's impact. However, this game payoff corresponds to an intractable optimization problem. To tackle the problem, we adopt the scenario approach to approximately compute the game payoff. Then, the optimal monitor selection is determined by analyzing the equilibrium of the zero-sum game. The proposed approach is illustrated via a numerical example of a 10-vertex networked control system.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑