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arXiv 2205.02060cs.GTcs.DSmath.STstat.MLstat.TH
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标准拍卖模型的估计

Estimation of Standard Auction Models

Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri, Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Manolis Zampetakis

摘要:

我们提供了有效的估计方法,第一和第二价格拍卖独立(非对称)的私人价值和部分可观性。给定一组有限的观察,每个包括的身份的赢家和他们支付的价格在一系列相同的拍卖,我们提供的算法,非参数估计每个投标人的出价分布,以及他们的价值分布下的均衡假设。我们提供有限样本估计的界限是统一的,他们的出错率不依赖于投标/价值分布估计。我们的估计保证了计量经济学中的一系列工作,其中只有识别结果已经获得,除非设置是对称的,参数化的,或者所有的出价都是可观察的。我们的保证还提供了计算和统计上有效的替代可靠性理论的经典技术。最后,我们的结果是立即适用于荷兰和英国的拍卖。

英文摘要:

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the price they paid in a sequence of identical auctions, we provide algorithms for non-parametrically estimating the bid distribution of each bidder, as well as their value distributions under equilibrium assumptions. We provide finite-sample estimation bounds which are uniform in that their error rates do not depend on the bid/value distributions being estimated. Our estimation guarantees advance a body of work in Econometrics wherein only identification results have been obtained, unless the setting is symmetric, parametric, or all bids are observable. Our guarantees also provide computationally and statistically effective alternatives to classical techniques from reliability theory. Finally, our results are immediately applicable to Dutch and English auctions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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