相互依赖的公共项目

Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions

When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We also identify two natural special scenarios where this decision problem is tractable.…

Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy wit…

Redistribution in Public Project Problems via Neural Networks

Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is necessary to design mechanisms (collective decision-making rules) with desired properties and objectives. The VCG redistribution mechanisms are efficient (the agents who value the resources the most will be allocated), strategy-proof (the agents have no incentives to lie about their valuations), and weakly budget-balanced (no deficits). We focus on the VCG redistribution mechanisms for the classic public pr…

动态信念下公共项目众筹行为分析

Analyzing Crowdfunding of Public Projects Under Dynamic Beliefs

针对公共项目众筹静态信念机制下的截止日出资竞赛问题，将主体信念建模为随机游走，提出动态信念场景下的PPRx-DB机制，证明其可实现均衡筹资且满足条件时主体会立即出资，可缓解竞赛问题。

Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects

Civic Crowdfunding is emerging as a popular means to mobilize funding from citizens for public projects. A popular mechanism deployed on civic crowdfunding platforms is a provision point mechanism, wherein, the total contributions must reach a predetermined threshold in order for the project to be provisioned (undertaken). Such a mechanism may have multiple equilibria; unfortunately, in many of these equilibria, the project is not funded even if it is highly valued among the agents. Recent work has proposed mechanisms with refund bonuses where the project gets funded in equilibrium if its net …

Mechanism Design for Public Projects via Neural Networks

We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project problems. We aim to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected social welfare. For the nonexcludable public project model, we identify a sufficient condition on the prior distribution for the conservative equal costs mechanism to be the optimal strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism. For general distributions, we propose a dynamic program that solves for the optimal mechanism. For the excludable public project model, we identify a similar sufficient condition for the serial cost sharing…

带有最小发布延迟的成本分摊公共项目

Cost Sharing Public Project with Minimum Release Delay

研究可排除二元公共项目模型中通过设置不同项目发布延迟以激励支付覆盖成本的机制设计，提出单一截止期限、顺序一致及基于组的最佳截止期限机制，分别实现渐近最优和无先验下的竞争力。

A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization

In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial-time. We design a polynomial…

无界精度下渐近最优公共项目再分配：复分析证明

Asymptotically Optimal Public Project Redistribution without Bounded Precision: A Complex-Analytic Proof

本文针对公共项目VCG再分配机制，移除有界精度假设，构造了适用于[0,1]区间实类型的确定性匿名策略防卫无赤字机制，通过复分析证明其最坏情况效率比为1-O(1/log log n)。

Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule

We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available budget, such as participatory budgeting or voluntary tax programs, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of the individual contributions. In the preference aggregation problem that we study, agents report linear utility functions over…

Public projects, Boolean functions and the borders of Border's theorem

Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known generalizations of Border's theorem either restrict attention to relatively simple settings, or resort to approximation. This paper identifies a complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class separations, that Border's theorem cannot be extended significantly beyond the state-of-the-art. We also identify a surprisingly tight connection b…

具有偏好和预测的公共项目

Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions

针对公共项目决策，提出两阶段机制，结合预测市场与投票，并利用二次转移机制，实现抗操纵且满足无政府状态价格保证，首次给出非渐近界。