公共项目供给中的平均分担原则
The egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public projects
摘要：
在本文中，我们考虑一个将自己划分为不相交的管辖区的社会，每个管辖区选择其公共项目的位置和税收计划来为其提供资金。公共项目是多维的，并且它们的成本可能因管辖区而异。我们施加两个原则，平均主义，这需要在同一管辖范围内的所有代理人的总成本的均衡，和效率，这意味着在管辖范围内的总成本最小化。我们表明，这两个原则总是产生一个核心稳定分区，但纳什稳定分区可能不存在。
英文摘要：
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
