公共工程问题的序贯枢纽机制
Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems
摘要：
众所周知，对于一些自然决策问题，不存在预算平衡的Groves机制。这促使最近进行研究，设计各种可行的格罗夫斯机制（称为“VCG（Vickrey-Clarke-Groves）付款的再分配”），以减少赤字。考虑到这一点，我们研究顺序机制，并考虑最佳策略，可以减少赤字下产生的同时机制。我们发现，这样的战略存在的顺序枢纽机制的著名的公共项目问题。最后，我们证明了这些策略可以通过实现纳什均衡来实现。
英文摘要：
It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium.
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