从盐矿中提取Godl：以太坊矿工提取价值
Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value
摘要：
加密货币矿工在决定他们接受哪些交易（包括他们自己的交易）以及他们接受交易的顺序方面有很大的自由度。以太坊矿工特别利用这种灵活性来收集MEV-Miner可提取价值-通过构建交易来提取额外收入。以太坊还包含许多机器人，试图根据公开但尚未确认的交易获得MEV。私人中继通过直接向矿池提交交易来保护这些机器人的操作。在这项工作中，我们开发了一种算法来检测MEV开发存在于以前开采的块。我们使用我们的实现的检测器来分析MEV的使用和利润再分配，发现矿工使利润的最大份额，而不是独立的用户的私人继电器。更具体地说，（i）73%的私人交易隐藏了交易活动或重新分配矿工奖励，87.6%的MEV收集是通过私人提交的交易完成的，（ii）我们的算法在12天内发现价值超过600万美元的MEV利润，其中三分之二直接流向矿工，（iii）MEV占矿工交易费利润的9.2%。此外，在这12天里，我们还发现了四个区块，其中包含足够的MEV利润，使得时间强盗分叉攻击对大型矿工来说在经济上可行，从而破坏了整个以太坊的安全和稳定。
英文摘要：
Cryptocurrency miners have great latitude in deciding which transactions they accept, including their own, and the order in which they accept them. Ethereum miners in particular use this flexibility to collect MEV-Miner Extractable Value-by structuring transactions to extract additional revenue. Ethereum also contains numerous bots that attempt to obtain MEV based on public-but-not-yet-confirmed transactions. Private relays shelter operations from these selfsame bots by directly submitting transactions to mining pools. In this work, we develop an algorithm to detect MEV exploitation present in previously mined blocks. We use our implementation of the detector to analyze MEV usage and profit redistribution, finding that miners make the lion's share of the profits, rather than independent users of the private relays. More specifically, (i) 73% of private transactions hide trading activity or re-distribute miner rewards, and 87.6% of MEV collection is accomplished with privately submitted transactions, (ii) our algorithm finds more than $6M worth of MEV profit in a period of 12 days, two thirds of which go directly to miners, and (iii) MEV represents 9.2% of miners' profit from transaction fees. Furthermore, in those 12 days, we also identify four blocks that contain enough MEV profits to make time-bandit forking attacks economically viable for large miners, undermining the security and stability of Ethereum as a whole.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
