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arXiv 2202.13470cs.CRcs.CY
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对否认性辩护的攻击

Attacks on Deidentification's Defenses

Aloni Cohen

摘要:

基于准标识符的去标识技术(QI-去标识)在实践中被广泛使用,包括$k$ -匿名、$\ell$ -多样性和$t$ -封闭性。我们提出了三个新的攻击QI去识别:两个理论攻击和一个实际的攻击一个真正的数据集。与以前的工作相比,我们的理论攻击工作,即使每个属性是一个准标识符。因此,它们适用于$k$ -匿名、$\ell$ -多样性、$t$ -接近性和大多数其他QI-去识别技术。首先,我们介绍了一类新的隐私攻击称为下编码攻击,并证明了每一个QI去识别方案是脆弱的下编码攻击,如果它是最小的和分层的。其次,我们将下编码攻击转换为强大的谓词挑出(PSO)攻击,这是最近提出的一种方法,以证明隐私机制无法在欧洲的一般数据保护条例下合法匿名。第三,我们使用LinkedIn.com在EdX发布的$k$匿名数据集中重新识别3名学生(并显示数千人可能易受攻击),破坏了EdX声称遵守家庭教育权利和隐私法的规定。这项工作的意义,既有科学意义,也有政治意义。我们的理论攻击表明,QI-deidentification可能无法提供保护,即使每个属性被视为一个准标识符。我们的实际攻击表明,即使是按照严格的隐私法规行事的去识别专家也无法阻止现实世界的重新识别。他们一起反驳了QI去识别化的基本原则,并挑战了为证明继续使用$k$ -匿名和其他QI去识别化技术的合理性而提出的实际论点。

英文摘要:

Quasi-identifier-based deidentification techniques (QI-deidentification) are widely used in practice, including $k$-anonymity, $\ell$-diversity, and $t$-closeness. We present three new attacks on QI-deidentification: two theoretical attacks and one practical attack on a real dataset. In contrast to prior work, our theoretical attacks work even if every attribute is a quasi-identifier. Hence, they apply to $k$-anonymity, $\ell$-diversity, $t$-closeness, and most other QI-deidentification techniques. First, we introduce a new class of privacy attacks called downcoding attacks, and prove that every QI-deidentification scheme is vulnerable to downcoding attacks if it is minimal and hierarchical. Second, we convert the downcoding attacks into powerful predicate singling-out (PSO) attacks, which were recently proposed as a way to demonstrate that a privacy mechanism fails to legally anonymize under Europe's General Data Protection Regulation. Third, we use LinkedIn.com to reidentify 3 students in a $k$-anonymized dataset published by EdX (and show thousands are potentially vulnerable), undermining EdX's claimed compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. The significance of this work is both scientific and political. Our theoretical attacks demonstrate that QI-deidentification may offer no protection even if every attribute is treated as a quasi-identifier. Our practical attack demonstrates that even deidentification experts acting in accordance with strict privacy regulations fail to prevent real-world reidentification. Together, they rebut a foundational tenet of QI-deidentification and challenge the actual arguments made to justify the continued use of $k$-anonymity and other QI-deidentification techniques.

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