arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1901.11218cs.CR
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针对分片分布式账本中跨分片共识的重放攻击和防御

Replay Attacks and Defenses Against Cross-shard Consensus in Sharded Distributed Ledgers

Alberto Sonnino, Shehar Bano, Mustafa Al-Bassam, George Danezis

摘要:

我们提出了一系列针对分片分布式账本的重放攻击,目标是跨分片共识协议,例如最近提出的Chainspace和Omniledger。它们允许攻击者仅通过网络访问,以最小的努力双重花费或锁定资源。攻击者可以独立行动而不与任何节点勾结,即使所有节点都是诚实的,攻击也会成功;大多数攻击也可以在攻击周期内表现为故障。这些攻击对分片主导和客户端主导的跨分片共识方法都有效。最后,我们提出了Byzebra-一种新的跨分片共识协议,它对这些攻击具有免疫力。我们实现了一个原型的Byzantee和评估它在一个真正的基于云的测试平台上,显示我们的防御影响性能最小,整体性能超过以前的作品。

英文摘要:

We present a family of replay attacks against sharded distributed ledgers, that target cross-shard consensus protocols, such as the recently proposed Chainspace and Omniledger. They allow an attacker, with network access only, to double-spend or lock resources with minimal efforts. The attacker can act independently without colluding with any nodes, and succeed even if all nodes are honest; most of the attacks can also exhibit themselves as faults under periods of asynchrony. These attacks are effective against both shard-led and client-led cross-shard consensus approaches. Finally, we present Byzcuit - a new cross-shard consensus protocol that is immune to those attacks. We implement a prototype of Byzcuit and evaluate it on a real cloud-based testbed, showing that our defenses impact performance minimally, and overall performance surpasses previous works.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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