arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1902.08359cs.CR
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面向数据攻击的利用技术与防御

Exploitation Techniques and Defenses for Data-Oriented Attacks

Long Cheng, Hans Liljestrand, Thomas Nyman, Yu Tsung Lee, Danfeng Yao, Trent Jaeger, N. Asokan

摘要:

面向数据的攻击操纵非控制数据来改变程序的良性行为,而不破坏其控制流完整性。事实证明,即使存在控制流防御机制,这种攻击也会造成重大损害。然而,这些威胁尚未得到充分解决。在这篇SoK论文中,我们首先将面向数据的漏洞利用(包括面向数据的编程(DOP)攻击)映射到它们的假设/要求和攻击能力。我们还比较了已知的防御这些攻击,在方法,检测能力,开销和兼容性。然后,我们通过实验评估了基于英特尔处理器跟踪(PT)技术的检测方法的可行性。PT仅跟踪控制流,因此,通常认为对面向数据的安全性没有用处。然而,我们的工作表明,面向数据的攻击(特别是最近的DOP攻击)可能会在多个维度上对控制流行为产生副作用,这体现在PT跟踪中。基于此评估,我们讨论了构建可部署的面向数据的防御和开放的研究问题的挑战。

英文摘要:

Data-oriented attacks manipulate non-control data to alter a program's benign behavior without violating its control-flow integrity. It has been shown that such attacks can cause significant damage even in the presence of control-flow defense mechanisms. However, these threats have not been adequately addressed. In this SoK paper, we first map data-oriented exploits, including Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) attacks, to their assumptions/requirements and attack capabilities. We also compare known defenses against these attacks, in terms of approach, detection capabilities, overhead, and compatibility. Then, we experimentally assess the feasibility of a detection approach that is based on the Intel Processor Trace (PT) technology. PT only traces control flows, thus, is generally believed to be not useful for data-oriented security. However, our work reveals that data-oriented attacks (in particular the recent DOP attacks) may generate side-effects on control-flow behavior in multiple dimensions, which manifest in PT traces. Based on this evaluation, we discuss challenges for building deployable data-oriented defenses and open research questions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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