Stable cooperation emerges in stochastic multiplicative growth
International School for Advanced Studies (SISSA)（国际高等研究院）；Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences（马克斯·普朗克科学促进研究所数学系）；The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP)（阿卜杜斯·萨拉姆国际理论物理中心）
Lorenzo Fant, Onofrio Mazzarisi, Emanuele Panizon, Jacopo Grilli
备注：
5 pages, 2 figures
发表信息：
Fant, L., Mazzarisi, O., Panizon, E., & Grilli, J. (2023). Stable cooperation emerges in stochastic multiplicative growth. Physical Review E, 108(1), L012401
Understanding the evolutionary stability of cooperation is a central problem in biology, sociology, and economics. There exist only a few known mechanisms that guarantee the existence of cooperation and its robustness to cheating. Here, we introduce a mechanism for the emergence of cooperation in the presence of fluctuations. We consider agents whose wealth changes stochastically in a multiplicative fashion. Each agent can share part of her wealth as a public good, which is equally distributed among all the agents. We show that, when agents operate with long-time horizons, cooperation produces an advantage at the individual level, as it effectively screens agents from the deleterious effect of environmental fluctuations.
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Emergence of cooperation in nonlinear higher-order public goods games
Institute for Cross-disciplinary Physics and Complex Systems IFISC (CSIC-UIB)（交叉物理与复杂系统研究所）；Department of Network and Data Science, Central European University Vienna（中欧大学维也纳网络与数据科学系）；Human Evolutionary Ecology Group, Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, University of Zurich（苏黎世大学生物人类学系人类进化生态组）；Center for Networks and Complexity, Luiss University of Rome（罗马LUISS大学网络与复杂性中心）；Department of AI, Data and Decision Sciences, Luiss University of Rome（罗马LUISS大学人工智能、数据与决策科学系）
The hypothesis that living systems can benefit from operating at the vicinity of critical points has gained momentum in recent years. Criticality may confer an optimal balance between exceedingly ordered and too noisy states. We here present a model, based on information theory and statistical mechanics, illustrating how and why a community of agents aimed at understanding and communicating with each other converges to a globally coherent state in which all individuals are close to an internal critical state, i.e. at the borderline between order and disorder. We study --both analytically and c…
Cooperation is a persistent behavioral pattern of entities pooling and sharing resources. Its ubiquity in nature poses a conundrum. Whenever two entities cooperate, one must willingly relinquish something of value to the other. Why is this apparent altruism favored in evolution? Classical solutions assume a net fitness gain in a cooperative transaction which, through reciprocity or relatedness, finds its way back from recipient to donor. We seek the source of this fitness gain. Our analysis rests on the insight that evolutionary processes are typically multiplicative and noisy. Fluctuations ha…
Game theory research on the snowdrift game has showed that gradual evolution of the continuously varying level of cooperation in joint enterprises can demonstrate evolutionary merging as well as evolutionary branching. However, little is known about the consequences of changes in diversity at the cooperation level. In the present study I consider effects of costly rewards on the continuous snowdrift game. I show that not evolutionary merging but evolutionary branching can promote the emergence of pool reward, which can then enhance social welfare.
Complete strategy spaces reveal hidden pathways to cooperation
Teesside University（蒂斯赛德大学）；CSSC Systems Engineering Research Institute（中国船舶集团系统工程研究院）；Kyushu University（九州大学）；University of Maribor（马里博尔大学）；Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor（马里博尔市德拉夫·阿道夫·德罗尔奇社区健康中心）；Korea University（高丽大学）；Kyung Hee University（庆熙大学）
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of unforeseen circumstances, each player has a fixed probability of being unable to participate in the game, unlike similar models which assume voluntary participation. We first study how prescribed stochastic opting-out affects cooperation in finite populations. Moreover, in the model, cooperation is favored by natural selection over both neutral drift and defect…
Situations involving cooperative behaviour are widespread among animals and humans alike. Game theory and evolutionary dynamics have provided the theoretical and computational grounds to understand what are the mechanisms that allow for such cooperation. Studies in this area usually take into consideration different behavioural strategies and investigate how they can be fixed in the population under evolving rules. However, how those strategies emerged from basic evolutionary mechanisms continues to be not fully understood. To address this issue, here we study the emergence of cooperative stra…
