We consider three equilibrium concepts proposed in the literature for time-inconsistent stopping problems, including mild equilibria, weak equilibria and strong equilibria. The discount function is assumed to be log sub-additive and the underlying process is one-dimensional diffusion. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the characterization of weak equilibria. The smooth-fit condition is obtained as a by-product. Next, based on the characterization of weak equilibria, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is also weak. Then we provide conditions under which a weak equilibrium is strong. We further show that an optimal mild equilibrium is also strong under a certain condition. Finally, we provide several examples including one shows a weak equilibrium may not be strong, and another one shows a strong equilibrium may not be optimal mild.
We study an optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting, where the state process is a multi-dimensional continuous strong Markov process. The discount function is taken to be log sub-additive, capturing decreasing impatience in behavioral economics. On strength of probabilistic potential theory, we establish the existence of an optimal equilibrium among a sufficiently large collection of equilibria, consisting of finely closed equilibria satisfying a boundary condition. This generalizes the existence of optimal equilibria for one-dimensional stopping problems in prior literature…
We consider the game-theoretic approach to time-inconsistent stopping of a one-dimensional diffusion where the time-inconsistency is due to the presence of a non-exponential (weighted) discount function. In particular, we study (weak) equilibria for this problem in a novel class of mixed (i.e., randomized) stopping times based on a local time construction of the stopping intensity. For a general formulation of the problem we provide a verification theorem giving sufficient conditions for mixed (and pure) equilibria in terms of a set of variational inequalities, including a smooth fit condition…
This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of Itô and McKean (1974), p.\ 108). We provide sufficient conditions under which Nash equilibria are realised by each player stopping the diffusion at one of the two boundary points of an interval. The boundaries of this interval solve a system of algebraic equations. We also provide conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in this class.
Inspired by recent work of P.-L. Lions on conditional optimal control, we introduce a problem of optimal stopping under bounded rationality: the objective is the expected payoff at the time of stopping, conditioned on another event. For instance, an agent may care only about states where she is still alive at the time of stopping, or a company may condition on not being bankrupt. We observe that conditional optimization is time-inconsistent due to the dynamic change of the conditioning probability and develop an equilibrium approach in the spirit of R. H. Strotz' work for sophisticated agents …
We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of agents, typical equilibria become functions of the common noise that all agents are exposed to, whereas idiosyncratic randomness can be eliminated by an Exact Law of Large Numbers. Under a structural monotonicity assumption, we can identify equilibria with solutions of a simple equation involving the distribution function of the idiosyncratic noise. Solvable examples allow us to gain insight into…
We investigate the stability of the equilibrium-induced optimal value in one-dimensional diffusion setting for a time-inconsistent stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. We show that the optimal value is semi-continuous with respect to the drift, volatility, and reward function. An example is provided showing that the exact continuity may fail. With equilibria extended to $\varepsilon$-equilibria, we establish the relaxed continuity of the optimal value.
A \emph{new} notion of equilibrium, which we call \emph{strong equilibrium}, is introduced for time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in ArXiv: 1502.03998 and ArXiv: 1709.05181, which in this paper are called \emph{mild equilibrium} and \emph{weak equilibrium} respectively, a strong equilibrium captures the idea of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium more accurately. When the state process is a continuous-time Markov chain and the discount function is log sub-additive, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is always a strong equilibr…
In the nonzero-sum setting, we establish a connection between Nash equilibria in games of optimal stopping (Dynkin games) and generalised Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP). In the Dynkin game this reveals novel equilibria of threshold type and of more complex types, and leads to novel uniqueness and stability results.
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach relies on a time discretization of the control problem via n-person games, which are characterized via the maximum principle using Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs). The existence of equilibria is proved by applying weak convergence arguments to the solutions of n-person games. A numerical implementation is provided by approximating n-person ga…
We present a novel method for solving a class of time-inconsistent optimal stopping problems by reducing them to a family of standard stochastic optimal control problems. In particular, we convert an optimal stopping problem with a non-linear function of the expected stopping time in the objective into optimization over an auxiliary value function for a standard stochastic control problem with an additional state variable. This approach differs from the previous literature which primarily employs Lagrange multiplier methods or relies on exact solutions. In contrast, we characterize the auxilia…
Standard Markovian optimal stopping problems are consistent in the sense that the first entrance time into the stopping set is optimal for each initial state of the process. Clearly, the usual concept of optimality cannot in a straightforward way be applied to non-standard stopping problems without this time-consistent structure. This paper is devoted to the solution of time-inconsistent stopping problems with the reward depending on the initial state using an adaptation of Strotz's consistent planning. More precisely, we give a precise equilibrium definition --- of the type subgame perfect Na…
For a discrete time Markov chain and in line with Strotz' consistent planning we develop a framework for problems of optimal stopping that are time-inconsistent due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward. We consider pure and mixed stopping strategies and a (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. We provide different necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions including a verification theorem. Using a fixed point argument we provide equilibrium existence results. We adapt and study the notion of the myopic adjustment process and introduce different kinds of equilib…
We study solutions of a class of one-dimensional continuous reflected backward stochastic Volterra integral equations driven by Brownian motion, where the reflection keeps the solution above a given stochastic process (lower obstacle). We prove existence and uniqueness by a fixed point argument and we derive a comparison result. Moreover, we show how the solution of our problem is related to a time-inconsistent optimal stopping problem and derive an optimal strategy.
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players' decisions. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the staff selection competition in the case of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republican and libertarian concepts of correlated equi…
We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean field type with time inconsistent cost functionals, and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is extended to a mean field game to construct decentralized strategies and obtain an estimate of their performance.
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game. We place ourselves in the framework of relaxed optimal stopping, which amounts to looking for the optimal occupation measure of the stopper rather than the optimal stopping time. This framework allows us to prove the existence of the relaxed Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the associated value of the representative agent under mild assumptions. Further…
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable payoff. Typically the payoff process of the max-player is assumed to be smaller than the payoff process of the min-player, while the payoff process for simultaneous stopping is in between the two. In this paper, we study general Dynkin games whose payoff processes are in arbitrary positions. In both discrete and continuous time settings, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and epsilon-optimal …
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a constructive algorithm. One of the main features is that the payoffs of the players depend on the set of players that stop at the termination stage which is the minimal stage in which at least one player stops. The existence result is extended to the case of a nonzero-sum game with finite horizon. Finally, the algorithm is illustrated by two explicit examples i…
We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε>0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.
We formulate an optimal stopping problem for a geometric Brownian motion where the probability scale is distorted by a general nonlinear function. The problem is inherently time inconsistent due to the Choquet integration involved. We develop a new approach, based on a reformulation of the problem where one optimally chooses the probability distribution or quantile function of the stopped state. An optimal stopping time can then be recovered from the obtained distribution/quantile function, either in a straightforward way for several important cases or in general via the Skorokhod embedding. T…
In this paper, we continue our study on a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear--quadratic (LQ) control problem originally formulated in [6]. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium controls via a flow of forward--backward stochastic differential equations. When the state is one dimensional and the coefficients in the problem are all deterministic, we prove that the explicit equilibrium control constructed in \cite{HJZ} is indeed unique. Our proof is based on the derived equivalent condition for equilibria as well as a stochastic version of the Lebesgue differentia…
We develop a theory for continuous-time non-Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Their distinguishing feature is that the classical Bellman optimality principle no longer holds. Our formulation is cast within the framework of a controlled non-Markovian forward stochastic differential equation, and a general objective functional setting. We adopt a game-theoretic approach to study such problems, meaning that we seek for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium points. As a first novelty of this work, we introduce and motivate a refinement of the definition of e…
Equilibrium under Time-Inconsistency: A New Existence Theory by Vanishing Entropy Regularization
Zhongtai Securities Institute for Financial Studies, Shandong University（山东大学中泰金融研究院）；Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University（香港理工大学应用数学系）；China School of Banking and Finance, University of International Business and Economics（对外经济贸易大学中国金融学院）；School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sydney（悉尼大学数学与统计学院）
