Correlated Equilibria in Competitive Staff Selection Problem
David M. Ramsey, Krzysztof Szajowski
备注：
The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, International Conference in Memory of Jerzy Los(1920 - 1998), Warsaw, September 2004
发表信息：
Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Banach Center Publications vol. 71, Editors: A. Wieczorek, M. Malawski and A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Warszawa 2006, p. 253-265
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California Institute of Technology（加州理工学院）；Georgia Institute of Technology（佐治亚理工学院）；University of California San Diego（加利福尼亚大学圣迭戈分校）；Nvidia（英伟达）
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