计算非管制电力市场的竞争均衡的去中心化机制
A Decentralized Mechanism for Computing Competitive Equilibria in Deregulated Electricity Markets
AI总结：
本文提出一种去中心化机制，利用拉格朗日对偶理论，使电力市场参与者在信息不对称和非线性因素下达成帕累托最优的竞争均衡。
摘要：
随着分布式发电和需求响应的增加，需要能够应对日益复杂非管制能源市场结构的相应机制。利用拉格朗日对偶理论，我们开发了一种去中心化市场机制，确保在市场运营商的指导下，自利的市场参与者——发电公司（GenCos）、配电公司（DistCos）和输电公司（TransCos）——能够达到竞争均衡。我们证明，即使在存在信息不对称和非线性因素（如电力损耗和输电约束）的情况下，所得到的竞争均衡也是帕累托最优的。
英文摘要：
With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants: generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
