arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2112.09052cs.CRcs.SYeess.SY
收藏

对Kirchhoff定律-Johnson噪声(KLJN)安全密钥交换协议的随机数发生器、零交叉和非线性攻击

Random Number Generator, Zero-Crossing, and Nonlinearity Attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Protocol

Christiana Chamon

摘要:

本文提出了三种针对KLJN方案的新型攻击。第一种攻击类型是基于受损的RNG。第一次RNG攻击是确定性的。首先,夏娃知道这两种噪音。她可以通过欧姆定律和一位的权力,在一小部分的位交换期。第二,Eve只知道Bob的噪声,所以她可以通过欧姆定律学习Bob的电阻值,并在比特交换周期结束时学习Alice的电阻。她也可以使用排除法。第二次RNG攻击是统计性的。首先,夏娃对爱丽丝和鲍勃的噪音有部分了解。她可以通过在她的噪声和线路中测量的噪声之间取最高的互相关,以及通过在她的噪声和Alice/Bob的噪声之间取最高的互相关来破解比特。第二,夏娃只知道爱丽丝的噪音的一部分。她仍然可以破解钻头,但在钻头交换期之后。第二种攻击类型是基于热力学。以前,KLJN方案需要热平衡。然而,Vadai等人在(Nature)Science Reports中展示了一种修改的方案,其中存在非零热噪声,但系统抵抗所有已知的攻击。我们利用线电流和电压之间的重合事件,并表明存在非零信息泄漏。一旦热平衡恢复,系统就再次完全安全。最后一种攻击类型是基于噪声发生器的非线性。我们探讨了在第二和第三阶失真的影响。它表明,1%的失真导致一个显着的信息泄漏。我们还表明,降低有效温度的结果在KLJN计划接近完美的安全性。

英文摘要:

This dissertation demonstrates three new types of attacks against the KLJN scheme. The first attack type is based on compromised RNGs. The first RNG attacks are deterministic. First, Eve knows both noises. She can crack the bit via Ohm's Law and one-bit powers within a fraction of the bit exchange period. Second, Eve knows only Bob's noise, so she can learn Bob's resistance value via Ohm's Law and Alice's resistance at the end of the bit exchange period. She can also use a process of elimination. The second RNG attacks are statistical. First, Eve has partial knowledge of Alice's and Bob's noises. She can crack the bit by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noises and the measured noise in the wire, and by taking the highest cross-correlation between her noises and Alice's/Bob's noises. Second, Eve has partial knowledge of only Alice's noise. She can still crack the bit, but after the bit exchange period. The second attack type is based on thermodynamics. Previously, the KLJN scheme required thermal equilibrium. However, Vadai, et al, in (Nature) Science Reports shows a modified scheme, where there is a non-zero thermal noise, yet the system resists all the known attacks. We utilize coincidence events between the line current and voltage and show that there is non-zero information leak. As soon as thermal equilibrium is restored, the system is perfectly secure again. The final attack type is based on the nonlinearity of the noise generators. We explore the effect of distortion at the second and third orders. It is demonstrated that 1% distortion results in a significant information leak. We also show that decreasing the effective temperature results in the KLJN scheme approaching perfect security.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑