关于基于Kirchhoff定律-Johnson噪声的安全密钥交换的最新研究
Notes on Recent Approaches Concerning the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise-based Secure Key Exchange
摘要：
我们批判性地分析了[Physics Letters A 373（2009）901-904]中的结果和主张。我们表明，在模拟中出现的强大的安全漏洞只是一个文物，而不是由“多次反射”。由于在信号最短波长5%的电缆长度处不存在波模式，因此不存在波来反射它。在高波阻抗限制下，模拟中使用的条件严重非物理（要求电缆直径比已知宇宙的测量尺寸大28000倍），结果是由于非物理值而产生的建模伪影。在低电缆阻抗限值下，观察到的伪影是由于违反了推荐（和测试）条件，忽略了电缆电容限制，并使用了比推荐长约100倍的电缆，而没有电缆电容补偿装置。我们实现和分析了刘的循环器的一般电路，并确认它们在概念上是安全的，对被动攻击。我们引入了一个不对称的，更强大的版本没有反馈回路。然后我们通过主动攻击来破解所有这些系统：基于循环器的中间人攻击。最后，我们分析了所提出的方法，以提高安全性，只丢弃高风险位。我们指出了不同类型的高风险比特之间的差异，并显示了一些简单的密钥交换协议的这种策略的不足。
英文摘要：
We critically analyze the results and claims in [Physics Letters A 373 (2009) 901-904]. We show that the strong security leak appeared in the simulations is only an artifact and not caused by "multiple reflections". Since no wave modes exist at cable length of 5% of the shortest wavelength of the signal, no wave is present to reflect it. In the high wave impedance limit, the conditions used in the simulations are heavily unphysical (requiring cable diameters up to 28000 times greater than the measured size of the known universe) and the results are modeling artifacts due to the unphysical values. At the low cable impedance limit, the observed artifacts are due to violating the recommended (and tested) conditions by neglecting the cable capacitance restrictions and using about 100 times longer cable than recommended without cable capacitance compensation arrangement. We implement and analyze the general circuitry of Liu's circulator and confirm that they are conceptually secure against passive attacks. We introduce an asymmetric, more robust version without feedback loop. Then we crack all these systems by an active attack: a circulator-based man-in-the middle attack. Finally, we analyze the proposed method to increase security by dropping only high-risk bits. We point out the differences between different types of high-risk bits and show the shortage of this strategy for some simple key exchange protocols.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
