Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson（-like）噪声密码的中间人攻击防护及基于电压的安全扩展
Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based security
摘要：
结果表明，如果窃听者使用与发送者和接收者相同的电阻和噪声电压发生器，那么原始的Kirchhoff loop Johnson（-like）-noise（KLJN）密码可以自然地抵御中间人（MITM）攻击.窃听者在被发现之前可以提取零比特的信息。然而，当窃听者使用噪声电流发生器时，尽管密码被保护，窃听者仍然可以在她被发现的同时提取一个比特的信息。为了增强安全性，我们扩展了KLJN密码的瞬时电压通过公共信道的比较。通过这种方式，发送方和接收方可以完全控制基尔霍夫环中可测量的物理量的安全性。我们表明，当发送器和接收器比较，不仅他们的瞬时电流数据，而且他们的瞬时电压数据，那么即使是噪声电流发生器的情况下，零位的安全性。我们发现，原来的KLJN计划也是零比特保护，防止这种类型的MITM攻击时，窃听者使用电压噪声发生器，只有。总之，在理想化的模型方案中，与之前考虑的常规攻击相比，中间人攻击不提供任何优势。剩下的可能性是通过短而大的电流脉冲进行攻击，这在原始论文中被描述为唯一有效的常规攻击类型，并且产生1位安全性。总之，KLJN密码在各个方面都优于已知的量子通信方案，包括速度，鲁棒性，维护需求，价格及其对中间人攻击的天然免疫力。
英文摘要：
It is shown that the original Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise (KLJN) cipher is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, if the eavesdropper is using resistors and noise voltage generators just like the sender and the receiver. The eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information before she is discovered. However, when the eavesdropper is using noise current generators, though the cipher is protected, the eavesdropper may still be able to extract one bit of information while she is discovered. For enhanced security, we expand the KLJN cipher with the comparison of the instantaneous voltages via the public channel. In this way, the sender and receiver has a full control over the security of measurable physical quantities in the Kirchhoff-loop. We show that when the sender and receiver compare not only their instantaneous current data but also their instantaneous voltage data then the zero-bit security holds even for the noise current generator case. We show that the original KLJN scheme is also zero-bit protected against that type of MITM attack when the eavesdropper uses voltage noise generators, only. In conclusion, within the idealized model scheme, the man-in-the-middle-attack does not provide any advantage compared to the regular attack considered earlier. The remaining possibility is the attack by a short, large current pulse, which described in the original paper as the only efficient type of regular attacks, and that yields the one bit security. In conclusion, the KLJN cipher is superior to known quantum communication schemes in every respect, including speed, robustness, maintenance need, price and its natural immunity against the man-in-the-middle attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
