基于Kirchhoff定律-Johnson-noise方案的Bennett-Riedel攻击的临界分析
Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
摘要：
最近，Bennett和Riedel（BR）（http：//arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1）认为热力学在Kirchhoff定律-Johnson-noise（KLJN）经典物理密码交换方法中不是必需的，试图反驳KLJN方案的安全性。他们试图通过引入一种具有两个电池和两个开关的无耗散确定性密钥交换方法来证明这一点。在本文中，我们首先表明，BR的计划是非物理的，它的假设的一些元素违反了安全通信的基本协议。我们所有的分析都是基于一个技术上无限的夏娃，它具有无限精确和快速的测量，只受物理学和统计学定律的限制。对于非理想情况和主动（入侵）攻击，测量持续时间和统计误差之间的不确定性原则使得Eve不可能提取密钥，无论她测量的准确性或速度如何。为了证明热力学和噪声对安全性至关重要，我们以10种不同的方式通过被动攻击100%成功地破解了BR系统，并证明了相同的破解方法对于采用约翰逊噪声提供热力学第二定律支持的安全性的KLJN方案不起作用。我们还提出了一个批判性的分析，其他一些索赔BR，例如，我们证明了他们的方程描述零安全不适用于KLJN计划。最后，我们给出了数学安全性证明的每一个BR-攻击对KLJN计划，并得出结论，信息论（无条件）安全的KLJN方法尚未成功地挑战。
英文摘要：
Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically-unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.
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