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arXiv 2111.08404cs.CR
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内存压缩的实用定时侧信道攻击

Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks on Memory Compression

Martin Schwarzl, Pietro Borrello, Gururaj Saileshwar, Hanna Müller, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss

摘要:

压缩算法被广泛使用,因为它们节省内存而不会丢失数据。然而,消除数据中的冗余符号和序列导致压缩侧信道。到目前为止,压缩攻击仅集中在压缩比侧通道上,即,压缩数据的大小,以及主要针对的HTTP流量和网站内容。在本文中,我们提出了第一个内存压缩攻击利用定时侧通道的压缩算法,针对广泛的应用程序使用压缩。我们的工作系统地分析了不同的压缩算法,并演示了在每一个时间泄漏。我们提出Comprezzor,一个进化的模糊器,它发现内存布局,导致放大的延迟差异解压缩,从而使远程攻击。我们展示了一个远程隐蔽通道,利用小的本地时间差,平均643.25位/小时,在互联网上传输超过14跳。我们还演示了内存压缩攻击,可以泄漏秘密字节以及在字典式攻击在三个不同的案例研究。首先,我们证明了攻击者可以使用Memcached在PHP应用程序中公开与攻击者数据共存并压缩的秘密。第二,我们提出了一个攻击,从PostgreSQL泄漏数据库记录,由Python-Flask应用程序管理,通过互联网。第三,我们演示了一个攻击,从透明压缩页面与ZRAM,Linux中的内存压缩模块泄漏秘密。我们的结论是内存压缩攻击是一个实际的威胁。

英文摘要:

Compression algorithms are widely used as they save memory without losing data. However, elimination of redundant symbols and sequences in data leads to a compression side channel. So far, compression attacks have only focused on the compression-ratio side channel, i.e., the size of compressed data,and largely targeted HTTP traffic and website content. In this paper, we present the first memory compression attacks exploiting timing side channels in compression algorithms, targeting a broad set of applications using compression. Our work systematically analyzes different compression algorithms and demonstrates timing leakage in each. We present Comprezzor,an evolutionary fuzzer which finds memory layouts that lead to amplified latency differences for decompression and therefore enable remote attacks. We demonstrate a remote covert channel exploiting small local timing differences transmitting on average 643.25 bit/h over 14 hops over the internet. We also demonstrate memory compression attacks that can leak secrets bytewise as well as in dictionary attacks in three different case studies. First, we show that an attacker can disclose secrets co-located and compressed with attacker data in PHP applications using Memcached. Second, we present an attack that leaks database records from PostgreSQL, managed by a Python-Flask application, over the internet. Third, we demonstrate an attack that leaks secrets from transparently compressed pages with ZRAM,the memory compression module in Linux. We conclude that memory-compression attacks are a practical threat.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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