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arXiv 2110.09469quant-phcs.CR
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Quantum Lock:一种可证明的量子通信优势

Quantum Lock: A Provable Quantum Communication Advantage

Kaushik Chakraborty, Mina Doosti, Yao Ma, Chirag Wadhwa, Myrto Arapinis, Elham Kashefi

AI总结:

针对PUFs易受机器学习攻击的漏洞,本文提出混合锁定PUFs(HLPUFs),通过将经典PUF输出编码为非正交量子态并引入quantum lock技术,实现了可证明的安全性,同时允许服务器重用挑战-响应对进行长期客户端认证。

摘要:

物理不可克隆函数(PUFs)通过利用固有的物理随机性为物理实体提供独特的指纹。Gao等人讨论了当今大多数PUFs在面对基于机器学习的复杂攻击时的脆弱性。我们通过整合经典PUFs和现有的量子通信技术来解决这个问题。具体而言,本文提出了一种可证明安全的PUFs通用设计,称为混合锁定PUFs(HLPUFs),为保护经典PUFs提供了实用解决方案。HLPUF使用经典PUF(CPUF),并将输出编码为非正交量子态,从而向任何对手隐藏底层CPUF的结果。在此,我们引入了quantum lock以保护HLPUFs免受任何一般对手的攻击。非正交量子态的不可区分性属性,结合quantum lockdown技术,阻止了对手访问CPUFs的结果。此外,我们表明,通过利用量子态的非经典特性,HLPUF允许服务器重用挑战-响应对以进行进一步的客户端认证。这一结果为在较长时间内运行基于PUFs的客户端认证提供了高效解决方案,同时在服务器端维护一个小型挑战-响应对数据库。随后,我们通过使用可访问的真实世界CPUFs实例化HLPUFs设计来支持我们的理论贡献。我们使用最优的经典机器学习攻击来伪造CPUFs和HLPUFs,并在我们的数值模拟中认证了安全性差距,该构建已准备好进行实现。

英文摘要:

Physical unclonable functions(PUFs) provide a unique fingerprint to a physical entity by exploiting the inherent physical randomness. Gao et al. discussed the vulnerability of most current-day PUFs to sophisticated machine learning-based attacks. We address this problem by integrating classical PUFs and existing quantum communication technology. Specifically, this paper proposes a generic design of provably secure PUFs, called hybrid locked PUFs(HLPUFs), providing a practical solution for securing classical PUFs. An HLPUF uses a classical PUF(CPUF), and encodes the output into non-orthogonal quantum states to hide the outcomes of the underlying CPUF from any adversary. Here we introduce a quantum lock to protect the HLPUFs from any general adversaries. The indistinguishability property of the non-orthogonal quantum states, together with the quantum lockdown technique prevents the adversary from accessing the outcome of the CPUFs. Moreover, we show that by exploiting non-classical properties of quantum states, the HLPUF allows the server to reuse the challenge-response pairs for further client authentication. This result provides an efficient solution for running PUF-based client authentication for an extended period while maintaining a small-sized challenge-response pairs database on the server side. Later, we support our theoretical contributions by instantiating the HLPUFs design using accessible real-world CPUFs. We use the optimal classical machine-learning attacks to forge both the CPUFs and HLPUFs, and we certify the security gap in our numerical simulation for construction which is ready for implementation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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